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ARTICLE
SEXUAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ACTIONS:
REFINING THE PROPENSITY RULE
JANE HARRIS AIKEN*

Who will believe thee, Isabel?
My unsoiled name, th' austereness of my life,
My vouch against you, and my place i' th' state,
Will so your accusation overweigh
That you shall stifle in your own report
And smell of calumny. . . .
Say what you can, my false o 'erweighs your true. 1
"With only one accuser . . . and everyone else saying
something contrary, the public is doubtful. But with
two accusers, no matter what the second's credibility,
the public really listens. '11

•
Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I thank the
University of South Carolina for summer research support and Washington University for
research support and a reduced teaching load during the writing of this article. I also
want to thank Katherine Goldwasser and Richard Kuhns, evidence experts, who guided
me in the production and refinement of the ideas, the Washington University faculty for
their intellectual support through the brown bag series and particularly, Neil Bernstein,
Kathleen Clark, Clark Cunningham, Barbara Flagg, Brad Joondeph, Daniel Keating,
Pauline Kim, Ronald Levin, Karen Tokarz and Peter Wiedenbeck. Thanks also go to
Annette Appell, James Flanagan, and Abbe Smith. I am grateful to my research
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I.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 4, in WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 414 (Alfred Harbage ed., Penguin Books 1969)
(Angelo's response to Isabella, a nun who pleads with Angelo not to execute her brother,
when she claims that she will tell the world that Angelo has proposed she have sex with
him to buy her brother's life).
2.
JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 324 (1994) (quoting David Demarest, White House Communications
Director throughout the Clarence Thomas hearings, during a Republican strategy meeting
in which the participants discussed ways to prevent another woman from testifying about
Clarence Thomas's alleged sexually harassing behavior toward her).
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I. INTRODUCTION
When claims of sexual misconduct are made, two threads are often
seen in the kinds of questions raised: Did she "invite it," and has he ever
done it before?3 The way these questions are handled can determine the
outcome of a sexual misconduct case. In 1995, Congress weighed in on
whether these questions could be asked in civil cases in federal court and
adopted two significant changes to the rules of evidence. One, revised
Rule 412, 4 extends "rape shield" protection to civil actions that claim
sexual misconduct, including sexual harassment. The other, new Rule
415, 5 allows plaintiffs to offer evidence of a defendant's commission of
3.
Throughout this Article I use the female pronoun to refer to the plaintiff and
the male pronoun to refer to the defendant. Although the vast majority of sexual
misconduct cases reflect that assigrunent of sexes, I recognize that is not always true. I
use the specific pronouns to make the analysis easier to read and follow. The rules of
evidence do not designate the sex of alleged victims or perpetrators. Therefore, in those
cases where the genders are not as expected, the rules will still operate as analyzed in this
article.
4.
The portion of Rule 412 governing civil actions reads as follows:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.-The following evidence is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged
victim engaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged
victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.(1) ....

(2)

In a civil case, evidence offered to prove
the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is
admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value
substantially outweighs the danger of harm
to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party.
Evidence of an alleged
victim's reputation is admissible only if it
has been placed in controversy by the
alleged victim.

(c)
FED.

R. EVID. 412.
5.
Rule 415 states in relevant part:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting
an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that
party's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
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prior similar acts to prove that he is the kind of person who engages in
such sexual misconduct, and thus to imply that he engaged in it on the
occasion in question. 6
1f courts follow the rules and the Advisory Committee Notes
interpreting Rules 412 and 415, a plaintiffs sexual misconduct case today
will look very different than it would have just three years ago.. Instead
of voluminous testimony regarding the plaintiffs dress and personal
fantasies, the record might include testimony about the defendant's prior
misconduct. Instead of broad discovery into the plaintiffs sex life,
discovery might be directed toward prior sexual misconduct by the
defendant. The evidence might instead give the trier of fact a very
different picture of the plaintiff as a viCtim, the defendant as a
perpetrator, and, if offered under a theory of respondeat superior, might
significantly affect the corporate entity's financial liability for the
defendant's behavior.
Of the two changes, the more dramatic by far is new Rule 415.
Previously, the question of whether the defendant had engaged in prior
sexual misconduct could not be asked to corroborate the plaintiffs story.
This left jurors free to assume that the defendant was "Mr. Clean. "7 The
Rules of Evidence made it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to correct
this assumption. New Rule 415 purports to lift that restriction, at least
to some extent. Under this rule, evidence of certain types of prior acts8
may be "considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant. " 9 Thus, in theory, the plaintiff may offer evidence of such acts
or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as
provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
FED. R. EVID. 415. The Rule deals with sexual assault but the definition includes a broad
range of activities not commonly thought to be sexual assault. See infra part II.B.
6.
The bar to this prior act evidence is codified in Rule 404(a) which states:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
7.
See, e.g., Sandra S. Tangri et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three
Explanatory Models, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 43 (1982); infra part V.A.2.
8.
The Rule applies in sexual assault or child molestation cases. See infra notes
29-33 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EVID. 413(a); see, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553,
9.
556 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1481 (1997)(noting that rules 413,414, and
415 were added to make evidence of similar sexual crimes or acts expressly admissible
without regard to Rule 404(b)); United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872, 876 (lOth Cir.
1996) (relying on Rule 413's historical notes to allow general propensity evidence);
United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220, at •2 (N.D. lli. July 8, 1997)
(discussing the relevance standard to be used with Rule 413).
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to show that the defendant is the sort of person who would engage in
sexual misconduct, and argue that conclusion to the jury .10
Despite this potential for dramatic change, revised Rules 412 and 415
have not had such an impact. An analysis of how Rule 4I2 has been
applied in civil cases reveals a mixed response to the goals of the rule.
Courts are more willing to be suspicious of broad inquiries into a
plaintiff's sexual history even at discovery." At the same time, they are
finding new relevance for such evidence when evaluating damage claims.
10.
Senator Dole said on the floor of the Senate: "I think if somebody is a repeat
offender, if you brought in eight or nine women, for example . . . and he had one offense
after another, it would be probative." 139 CONG. REc. Sl5020-0l, Sl5073 (1993).
11.
Rule 412 governs the admissibility of evidence at trial and therefore does not
directly govern a party's behavior during the discovery process. This is a significant gap
in the rule. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 5393.1 (1997). Far more victims go through the discovery
process than go to trial. Furthermore, the abuses are likely to be greater at this stage
since discovery occurs without the presence of a judge to protect the victim. The drafters
were aware that the same concerns at trial existed during the discovery process and urged
that such wholesale investigations into the plaintiff's sexual activities and predisposition
be curbed throughout the litigation. The Advisory Committee's Note to revised Rule 412
ur~es judges to make liberal use of Rule 26(c) protective orders and not to undermine the
intent of the rule through the discovery process. The note states that "[c]ourts should
presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery
makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the
facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained except through
discovery." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (c). Unfortunately, the burden
remains on the plaintiff to show good cause for a protective order against abusive
discovery at a time in which the relevance rules are relaxed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
Thus federal courts have considerable power, should they choose to exercise it, to
grant protective orders to limit this line of defense. There has already been considerable
case law supporting the applicability of Rule 412 to discovery. See, e.g., Holt v. Welch
Allyn, Inc., No. 95-CV-1135 (RSP\GJD), 1997 WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997);
Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., I71 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md.
1997); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996); Stalnaker
v. Kmart Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-2444-GTV, 1996 WL 397563 (D. Kan. July 11, 1996);
Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 300 (D.N.M. 1996); Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., No. 942396-GTV, 1995 WL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995); Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., No.
91 Civ. 0918 (WK}(AJP}, 1995 WL 476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995); Alberts v.
Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93 C 4397, 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. Dl. Mar. 15, 1995). These
cases all recognize that Rule 412 is a rule of admissibility, but point to the Advisory
Committee's Note to support a closer scrutiny of discovery requests and more permissive
grants of protective orders. At the discovery stage, however, the protections of Rule 412
must be htvoked by a motion for protective order brought by the plaintiff. At trial, the
defense bears the burden of meeting notice requirements and demonstrating admissibility
of the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 412(c). If the plaintiff does not move for such
protection, there appears to be no bar to seeking the information as long as the defense
has a good-faith belief that such information could lead to admissible evidence. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 26.
I
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Case law after the implementation of amended Rule 412 suggests that if
the plaintiff asserts a claim for mental or emotional damages, her sexual
history and predisposition are likely to be discoverable and perhaps
admissible. 12
While Rule 412 has thus achieved, at best, inconsistent results, Rule
415 has encountered especially blunt resistance. Judges simply are not
admitting sexual character evidence offered to show general propensity .13
When they encounter such evidence in civil cases, courts invoke
discretionary authority to exclude it. 14 This approach runs counter to the
plain meaning of the rule and substantially limits its impact. This Article
explores the reach of Rule 415, analyzes how courts have limited its
effect, and suggests how the rule can be modified to ensure it provides the
corroboration necessary for achieving justice in sexual misconduct cases.
Part 11 assesses the potential impact of Rule 415. Part III traces the
development of Rule 415 and related rules regarding character evidence
in sexual misconduct cases. Part IV discusses how courts are assessing
probative value and prejudice when evidence of general propensity to
engage in sexual misconduct is admitted. Together, these parts of the
analysis demonstrate the need for a fresh look at the problem addressed
by Rule 415. Part V provides that look. It develops a principled way of
approaching the refinement of Rule 415, addressing concerns about lack
of symmetry (the notion that evidence of a defendant's sexual character
is admissible but comparable evidence about a plaintiff is not) and
demonstrating that those concerns are misplaced. The discussion
concludes with a proposed revision to Rule 415 which would continue to
make evidence of a defendant's sexual character admissible-indeed,
would allow it in a wider array of civil cases-while providing some
needed guidanee about when such evidenee should be admitted.
II. RULE 415

A. The Character Bar
A fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is that a
pers()n is tried for his specific acts, not for his bad character. This
principle is so strong that it prevents the admission of character evidence
even if that evidence is relevant to the acts charged. 15 The common law
12.
See Bottomly v. Leucadia ~at'l 163 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D. Utah 1995);
Ramirez, 1995 WL 609415, at *3; Alberts, 1995 WL 117886, at *3-4.
13.
See infra notes 83, 89 and accompanying text.
14.
/d.
15.
David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529 (1994). In European proceedings such evidence is
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propensity rule has its roots in the law of England: 16 by 1721, the
character bar was the law of the land. 17 Many pre-Revolutionary War
colonial courts followed the English courts in barring the use of general
propensity evidence. 18 American common law maintained a blanket rule
against offering evidence to argue action in conformity with character, but
carved out a number of circumstances in which prior acts could be offered
for non-propensity purposes such as motive, intent, absence of mistake,
common scheme or plan, and identity .19 The Supreme Court identified
the underlying concerns that motivated the character bar in Michelson v.
United States.w Explaining why common law had disallowed the
admission of evidence of a defendant's evil character to demonstrate that
he did the alleged act, Justice Jackson stated: "The inquiry is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge. "21
The Federal Rules' overriding principle is that probative evidence is
normally admissible unless there is a good reason not to admit it. Like
the common-law courts, the Federal Rules incorporate a suspicion of
general propensity evidence. Rule 404 generally will not allow a
proponent to introduce evidence in any form (opinion, reputation or
specific acts) showing that a person has a particular character trait if the
reason for introducing it is to argue that the person acted in conformity
routinely admitted. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 4, The Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial
(1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 751 (1989) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
LEGAL PoLICY!.
16.
Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts
Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1981). Cases as early
as 1684 reflected a growing support for the character bar. See Hampden's Trial, 9 How.
St. Tr. 1053 (K.B. 1684). In applying the rule against the admission of character
evidence in Harrison's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 834 (Old Bailey 1692), Lord Chief Justice
Holt stated: "Hold, what are you doing now? Are you going to arraign his whole life?
Away, away, that ought not be; that is nothing to the matter." /d. at 864.
17.
4 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE FOR THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 205-06
(London 1721), cited in Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain

Meaning: The Accused's Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to
Amend Rule 404(b), 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 651, 668 & n.109 (1993).
18.
Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, Are You Going to Arraign His
Whole Life? How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 15 (1996).
19. ·People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294-302 (N.Y. 1901).
335
469 (1948).
20.
/d. at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
21.

u.s.
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with the trait. 22 This said, however, the character bar is not absolute.
The rules allow admission of character evidence when sound policy
demands it. 23
Rule 415 states in part:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct
constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation,
evidence of that party's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and
may be considered [for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant] . . . . 24
22.
Rule 404 states in part: "Evidenee of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confonnity therewith on
a particular occasion .... " FED. R. EviD. 404(a). The concern that underlies the rules
is the risk the fact finder will rule against a party because he or she is a "bad person,"
regardless of the facts of the instant case. McConnick explains this concern:
[E]vidence that an individual is the kind of person who tends to behave in
certain ways almost always has some value as circumstantial evidence as to
how he acted . . . in the matter in question. . . . Yet, evidence of character
in any fonn-reputation, opinion from observation, or specific actsgenerally will not be received to prove that a person engaged in certain
conduct ....
EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §188, at 554 (3d ed. 1984).
23.
Recognized exceptions include impeachment by a prior conviction, based on
the idea that because of that prior conviction, the person impeached is the kind of person
who would lie on the witness stand. One can use the prior conviction to show that the
person has the propensity to lie but not ~e propensity to engage in similar conduct.
Indeed, if the prior conviction is very similar to the charged conduct, the argument that
it is more prejudicial than probative may succeed. See FED. R. EviD. 609(a). A person
can also be impeached by prior bad acts that have not been the subject matter of a
conviction if the acts are probative of truthfulness. Again, this fonn of impeachment may
be subject to an objection that the prejudicial effect outweighs the possible probative
value. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
A defendant in a criminal case may offer opinion and reputation evidence that
suggests he has a character trait that belies the charged conduct. If the defendant does so,
the prosecutor may offer opinion or reputation evidence to rebut the defendant's claim.
See, e.g., State v. Banks, 593 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). Uncharged
misconduct may also be offered if the relevance does not depend on general propensity
under Rule 404(b). Pennissible purposes include showing knowledge, identity, plan,
preparation, opportunity, motive, intent, absence of mistake, or accident. FED. R. EviD.
404(b). But see Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of
Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REv. 777 (1981) (noting that the difference between
what is prohibited and what is pennitted is unclear at best).
FED. R. EVID. 415(a) (referencing Rules 413 and 414 for the language that
24.
indicates that the evidence may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant). Rule 415(b) requires that a party offering such evidence disclose the evidence
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Rule 415 is thus a stark departure from the Anglo-Saxon evidentiary
principle that we evaluate people on the basis of what they do, not who
they are. As Senator Biden observed, it goes against "800 years of
experience" about what evidence should be admitted as relevant. 25 Rule
415, by its terms, allows blanket admission of certain prior acts even if
offered to show the defendant's character. Prior to Rule 415's enactment,
courts struggled to fmd a non-character reason to admit a defendant's
prior acts of sexual misconduct. They would typically rely on Rule
404(b), which enacts the common law exceptions to the ban against
evidence of prior acts. 26 Though courts have been increasingly willing
to admit evidence to show motive, opportunity, intent, plan, or absence
of mistake, TT character evidence has not been allowed. 28 However,
to the party against whom it is offered, including statements of the witnesses, at least
fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at a later time if the court allows for
good cause. FED. R. Evm. 415(b).
139 CONG. REC. S15020-01, S15072 (1993). Though Senator Biden's
25.
reference was a bit inflated, the adversarial system has treated general propensity evidence
with suspicion for at least 200 years. See Bryden & Park, supra note 15.
26.
Rule 404(b) states in part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident . . . .
FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Some courts have used "lustful disposition" as a supposedly noncharacter reason for admitting prior acts of sexual molestation. See, e.g., State v.
Lachterman, 812 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming lower court's
admission of prior sexual acts on a "depraved sexual instinct" theory), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 983 (1992). But see Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992) (abolishing
Indiana's "depraved sexual instinct" exception to character evidence).
David Bryden and Roger Park discuss how courts manipulate Rule 404(b) to admit
prior uncharged sexual offenses. They conclude that courts generally do not treat
evidence of uncharged sex offenses differently from other crimes. They do note,
however, that courts in a number of states are less likely to admit uncharged misconduct
in acquaintance rape cases than in stranger rape or child abuse cases. David P. Bryden
& Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv.
529, 560 (1994).
See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1424 (7th Cir.
27.
1986); Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial court admitted
evidence of harasser's prior voluntary workplace affair and prior harassment to show that
he used his supervisory power to "sexually exploit"); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance
Servs., Inc. 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (evidence of similar treatment of other
employees indicates evidence of plan admissible under 404); Webb v. Hyman, 861 F.
Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1994) (evidence of allegations of prior harassment by a particular
defendant towards other women is admissible because it provides direct evidence of a
contemporaneous hostile environment and concerned substantially similar behavior when
compared to allegations by plaintiff, thereby providing evidence of intent); Chomicki v.
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following the adoption of Rule 415, the proponent of prior acts evidence
need not be concerned about the niceties of framing it to conform to the
character bar. In cases that include sexual assault and child molestation,
the new rules presumably allow plaintiffs to argue that "because he did
this before, he probably did it this time."

B. Rule 415's Expansive Coverage
Rule 415's definition of sexual assault determines what actions will
open the door to this kind of evidence, as well as what evidence can be
used. The definition includes all crimes under federal or state law that
involve:
[C]ontact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's
body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person;
. . . contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of
the defendant and any part of another person's body; . . .
deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of
death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person
29

The definition appears to limit the rule to what is traditionally thought to
be rape or felony sexual assault. 30
Wittekind, 381 N.W.2d 561, 564-65 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (evidence of four other
incidents of harassment by alleged harasser admissible to show habit or routine practice
where factually similar to the case at bar).
The struggle is often unsuccessful. See, e.g., Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (court granted defendant's motion in limine
to exclude any evidence of alleged sexual affairs of the alleged harasser and claims of
sexual harassment against the alleged harasser with anyone other than the plaintiff);
Kresco v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff offered evidence
suggesting that defendant made a habit of sexually harassing women employees, court
found no 404(b) issues toward which the evidence could be offered).
28.
See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE (1984). Courts often act as if "noncharacter" uses of specific evidence are
logically distinct from offensive uses of prior acts to prove action in conformity. The
distinction is far from clear. Many permissible uses of specific-acts evidence rely on
"character logic." See, e.g., Ronald N. Boyce, Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing,
5 UTAH B.J. 31, 37 (1977); Kuhns, supra note 23, at 781; Reed, supra note 16, at 714.
FED. R. EVID. 413(d)(2)-(4).
29.
30.
If any state happens to criminalize the behavior described above, that evidence
would be admissible even if the activity was not a federal crime or a crime in the state
where the alleged events occurred. The legislative history is not clear whether the alleged
perpetrator must have committed the act in the state in .which it was subject to criminal
penalty, or if the definition includes all behavior that is criminalized in states even if not
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However, the defmition of "sexual assault" also includes "any
conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code. "31
This substantially expands the range of behavior that will be admissible.
Besides including aggravated sexual abuse, it also includes non-aggravated
sexual abuse: causing or attempting to cause another to engage in a
sexual act by placing the person in fear. In the "non-aggravated"
situation, it encompasses the fear of being fired or receiving
disadvantageous treatment for failure to comply. 32 The Code also
criminalizes abusive sexual contact. Sexual contact is defmed as "the
intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person. "33 Wright and Graham describe this
definition as "so broad that it includes conduct not often thought of as
criminal in some quarters; e.g., horseplay in which one co-worker
'gooses' another. "34 The definition notably does not include behavior
that might result in a sexually hostile work environment such as sexual
criminalized in the state in which the defendant resides. However, in the discussion of
their proposed alternative to Rules 413-415, the Evidence Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules struck the reference to state law as "unnecessarily confusing and
restrictive." FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(4) advisory committee's note. They explained that as
long as the conduct was of the sort described as criminal under federal law, it was
admissible "regardless of whether the actor was subject to federal jurisdiction." /d.
This suggests that acts which are criminal somewhere may be usable under Rule 415.
This is also supported by the interpretation of Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) evidence is not
limited to crimes. Even if the act was not criminal where it was done, it may still qualify
as an act or wrong for the purpose of the rule. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11,
§ 5239, at 454-59.
FED. R. EVID. 413(d)(1).
31.
32.
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5414, at 291 (Supp. 1997). Wright
and Graham note that sexual abuse includes what they call "petty rapes." They define
petty rapes as sexual activity involving "coercion employed by men who have the power
to hire and fire women to achieve sex not spontaneously offered them." /d. § 5382, at
517 n.41 (1980). They conclude that such employer coercion constitutes "petty rape" by
noting that the federal law contains a prohibition against sexual activity between a prisoner
and guard regardless of consent. The authors state:
In both cases, the perpetrator is in a position of power such that any
"consent" by the victim is or ought to be highly suspect. If the legislature
was willing to make this a crime with respect to prison guards without any
evidence of threats or fear, this makes it more likely that they would have also
intended to cover the case of the corporate executive who puts a subordinate
in "fear" by an explicit threat.
/d. § 5414, at n.46 (Supp. 1997).
33.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2246(3) (West Supp. 1997).
34.
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5414, at 291 (Supp. 1997)
(footnotes omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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comments and propositions. Attempts and conspiracy to commit such acts
would also be admissible. 35
The Code's definition of sexual assault increases the breadth of Rule
415 and its potential impact. It greatly enlarges the number of claims in
which sexual character evidence could be offered because the rule applies
to more cases than just damage suits over criminal acts of sexual assault.
Typical tort actions arising from sexual misconduct include claims of
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, seduction,. sexual harassment, transmission of sexually
transmitted disease, negligent entrustment and negligent supervision.
Sexual harassment suits often include allegations of unwanted sexual
touching (pinching bottoms, hands on breasts), thus invoking the
possibility of admission of other similar acts against harassers and their
employers. 36 Because Rule 415 will apply in sexual harassment cases
in which there has been physical contact, it is likely to have a greater
impact on the admission of evidence in federal courts than its companion
rules 413 and 414. 37 Federal jurisdiction, so elusive for a damage action
35.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(4)(C)(i).
36.
Wright and Graham note that:
Rule 415 reaches most of the forms of physical sexual contact in the
workplace for which employers are liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act under the rubric of "sexual harassment." The fanny-pinching executive
as well as the package deliveryman who sexually assaults a housewife may
provide the basis of a claim as to which Rule 415 is applicable.
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note II,§ 5412B, at 351 (Supp. 1997)(footnotes omitted).
Congress did not anticipate that these rules might be usable against corporate
defendants. There. was no corporate lobby against Rule 415. See id. Analytically, Rule
415 refers to prior bad acts of an individual. Since most circuits have determined that
there is no individual liability under Title VII, plaintiffs will be bringing their actions
against corporations. The corporate entity might assert as a defense that it is not a
"party" who allegedly committed the sexual misconduct, so evidence of the alleged
perpetrator's prior acts should not be usable against the business. In Cleveland v. KFC
National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 65-66 (N.D. Ga. 1996), the court found that
a corporate defendant should not be able to shield itself from character evidence offered
for the purposes of Rule 415 by asserting that the corporation is not a "party" since Title
VII prohibits liability from attaching to the actual "party." Wright and Graham suggest
that "415 is largely a dead letter unless it can be used against organizations that are or can
be insured against liability for the crimes of their employees or agents." 23 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note II, § 5414B, at 355 (Supp. 1997). Otherwise, Rule 415 would be
inapplicable in the Title VII context, and that would be inconsistent with congressional
intent. Cleveland, 948 F. Supp. at 65. The court therefore found that the prior acts of
the employee were attributable to the employer through the doctrine of respondeat
superior. ld. at 66.
37.
There are few federal criminal actions for sexual assault or child molestation.
On the other hand, the broadened definition of sexual assault is likely to make such
evidence very useful in sexual harassment cases and in Violence Against Women Act
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brought by the victim of rape, is readily available to victimized employees
because Title VII confers such jurisdiction. 38 Sexual harassment cases
are a substantial part of the federal docket. 39 Further, because a sexual
harassment action can reach the deeper pocket of the employer, there may
be more incentive to pursue the case. 40
The application of Rule 415 to sexual harassment cases is likely to
come as a surprise both to proponents of the new rules ~d to affected
parties.
David Karp, Senior Counsel in the Office of Policy
Development, United States Department of Justice, and author of these
rules, has characterized a typical offender whose past history would be
admissible under these rules as a member of "a small class of depraved
criminals" 41 with "the combination of aggressive and sexual impulses
that motivates the commission of such crimes, that he lacks effective
inhibitions against acting on these impulses, and that the risks involved do
not deter him. "42 Given the expansiveness of the definition of sexual
assault and the numbers of sexual harassment cases filed annually, that
small class of "depraved criminals" might be larger than Mr. Karp thinks.
The rule's justification, though perhaps politically appealing when
describing child molesters, loses much of its impact when describing a
fanny-pinching sexual harasser in the workplace. 43
claims, a cause of action included in the same bill. No feminist organization made
arguments in support of these rules. The choice not to argue in favor may have been
partially political. Although there was considerable overlap between civil libertarians and
feminists about the Violence Against Women Act, the coalition was not without its rough
spots. Rules 413, 414, and 415 were ardently opposed by the ACLU and other civil
libertarians. Feminist support for Rule 415 may have jeapordized the coalition needed to
pass the portions of the bill that included the Violence Against Women Act.
38.
The sponsors did not expect that the federal courts would entertain many such
civil claims anticipating instead that the rules' larger role would be to provide a model for
state rules. The sponsors noted: "The proposed new rules would apply directly in federal
cases, and would have broader significance as a potential model for state reforms." 137
CONG. REc. 6031 (1991). Victims suing their rapists or molesters would have difficulty
establishing federal jurisdiction even if they could find a deep pocket from which to exact
damages.
39.
According to the EEOC, the fastest growing area of employment
discrimination is sexual harassment claims. In 1996, 15,342 complaints were filed, up
from 6,127 in 1990. Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily;
New Law Boosts Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. PosT, May 12, 1997, at Al.
40.
Unless an individual is wealthy, he is likely to be judgment-proof. Most
insurance plans will not cover intentional acts. Corporations, on the other hand, are likely
to be able to afford to pay damage actions for torts or harassment by their employees.
41.
David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases
and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 24 (1994).
42.
/d. at 20.
43.
On the other hand, David Karp's description may ring true in the workplace
context. Sexual harassment can be devastating to a woman's health and well-being.
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Many employment lawyers handling harassment cas~s consider Rule
415 inapplicable to their cases. The National Employment Lawyer's
Associatl.on describes the definition as "fairly limited," without referring
to the rule's reference to the United States Code that includes the broader
defmition. 44 Even the President's lawyers were surprised to learn that
their plans to air Paula Jones's sexual history were prevented by revised
Rule 4i2, while similar sexual acts by him would likely be admissible
under Rule 415. 45
In addition to its expansive definition of covered acts, Rule 415
multiplies the sources for such evidence. 46 There is no time limit on the
uncharged conduct. 47 In the past, sexual character evidence in the form
of prior bad acts was restricted to acts in the workplace and often
Individuals who harass others may well share some of the same characteristics that Karp
is ascribing to rapists. See generally Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813
(1991) (making the analogy between problems of proof in rape cases and those that arise
in sexual harassment cases).
44.
MargaretA. Harris, Defending and Presenting Motions In Limine, NATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, 1997 Eighth Annual Convention, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada, June 25-28, 1997.
45.
See David Stout, Clinton Lawyer Retreats on Threat over Accuser's Sexual
Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at Al7. Ironically, President Clinton signed the law that
created both rules. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, §320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994). Paula Jones has proceeded
with a pattern and practice theory in her case against President Clinton. Michael lsikoff
& Stuart Taylor Jr., The Paula Problem, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1998, at 24. This has
allowed her broad discovery into the President's alleged sexual liaisons that may have
resulted in benefits to those who became his paramours. /d. These inquiries have
resulted in recent allegations about an affair with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.
See, e.g., Michael lsikoff & Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2,
1998, at 31. The alleged behavior, consensual sex, would not appear to be admissible
under Rule 415 unless the plaintiff could show that it was accomplished under conditions
of fear. Discovery of the alleged acts would be necessary to make that assessment. The
judge in the Jones case, U.S. District Judge Susan Webber Wright, has precluded further
discovery in the Lewinsky matter for other reasons, however. Stuart Taylor Jr.,
Explaining the Legal Fine Print, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1998, at 30.
See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
46.
47.
The lack of time limitation was challenged by opponents of the rule in debate.
Senator Joseph Biden posited a middle-aged defendant confronted with a witness who
would testify about acts he may have done when he was fifteen years old. Biden noted,
"to allow total, uncorroborated, unsubstantiated testimony about something that could have
happened-anything-from the day before to 50 years before into trial . . . absolutely
violates every basic tenet of our system." 140 CoNG. REC. Sl0277 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1994) (statement of Sen. Biden). Since the rules became effective, one court has allowed
the admission of evidence of prior child molestation under Rule 414 that arose over thirty
years before the charged event. United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (lOth Cir.
1997); see also United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997)(testimony covering
events from sixteen to twenty years prior was admissible under Rule 414).
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restricted to the time frame in which the plaintiffs complaints were made.
Rule 415 does not require a workplace nexus for prior acts of sexual
assault brought in as evidence. 48 Courts have looked outside the
workplace to minimize the effect of sexual behavior in the workplace. In
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. ,49 the court dismissed complaints of
sexual harassment that included vulgar and pornographic poster displays
within the workplace. One poster showed a woman with a golf ball
between her breasts and a man with a golf club standing over her and
yelling "fore!" The court characterized the impact of such displays on
the environment as "de minimis ... when considered in the context of
a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits
open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on primetime television, at the cinema, and in other public places. "50
Using this logic, a plaintiff could argue that the outside behavior of
the alleged harasser is useful to determine whether his likely workplace
behavior is socially acceptable. If 415 evidence is introduced, the
defendant's prior behavior constitutes, by the terms of the rules, a
criminal offense, and is presumptively socially unacceptable. This assists
plaintiffs because a witness to sexual assault behavior outside the
workplace can testify without fear of retaliation on the job. A plaintiff
might gamer evidence from the defendant's former place of employment
or establish potential evidence of the defendant's behavior in social
settings. For example, the plaintiff might offer testimony of waitresses
from a local bar who say the defendant is a customer and regularly
attempts to fondle the buttocks or breasts of waitresses while they are
serving him. Domestic assault might also meet the federal definition. A
supervisor's ex-wife might be willing to testify to sexual abuse during the
marriage that caused her to seek a protection order.
The above examples appear to fall within Rule 415's definition of
sexual assault. As a preliminary step, the plaintiff must then argue that
such evidence is relevant to the claim. Rule 415 requires only that the
evidence be relevant. Rule 401, governing relevance, is an extremely low
threshold: it encompasses all "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. "51 Whether the defendant engaged in the alleged acts is
certainly a fact of consequence, and his sexual character adds an
48.
See, e.g., Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp 620, 622 (D.N.J. 1996)
(rejecting evidence of molestation of stepdaughter in sexual harassment case on grounds
that it was inflammatory, but impliedly accepting that it fell within Rule 415).
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
49.
50.
Id. at 622.
FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
51.
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inferential link in determining that fact. Because Rule 415 specifically
allows a general propensity argument, the plaintiff might be able to show
sufficiently similar circumstances to suggest that this is the kind of man
who responds toward women in sexually inappropriate ways when in a
position of relative power. 52 The possibility of such explicit character
arguments, formerly unheard in courts, demonstrates the potential
siguificance of the change that Congress has wrought.

ill.

CONGRESS'S FORAY INTO CHARACTER EVIDENCE

The Federal Rules of Evidence are largely a codification of common
law.
The rules are designed for general applicability, be the case
criminal or civil, regardless of the substance of the litigation. Congress
conferred the power to create these rules on the Supreme Court through
the Rules Enabling Act, 54 under which process changes in the rules
originate not in Congress but in the federal court system. The Act
empowers the Court to create new rules or modify existing ones, as long
as the change is procedural and not substantive. A rule making its way
through the process will be scrutinized and reviewed many times: the
governing body of the Federal Judicial Conference of the United States
develops and proposes rule changes which must then be approved by the
Supreme Court before being submitted to Congress. Typically, the rules
are the result of study and recommendation from an Advisory Committee
to the Judicial Conference. Proposed rules take effect six months after
submission unless rejected or modified by Congress. Congress retains the
power to propose and enact evidentiary rules on its own initiative,
although since the 1975 passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has
rarely done so.
53

52.
In the examples offered above, the relevance of the evidence from employees
at a prior work site is probably easiest to establish. More problematic would be showing
the relevance of the defendant's treatment of the waitresses by arguing, for example, that
it is analogous to the defendant's behavior in a supervisory relationship. The most
difficult argument, even under the pure propensity theory, would be the admissibility of
domestic sexual abuse. Many courts are reluctant to analogize the relationship between
intimates with the supervisory relationship in an employment setting. Nevertheless,
depending on how the court reads the expansiveness of Rule 415's language, even this
evidence might be admissible to· support the contention that the defendant engaged in the
acts in question. Both domestic violence and sexual harassment are misuses of power and
exercises of domination.
53.
See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5006.
54.
28 u.s.c. §§ 2071-77 (1994).
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In developing Rules 413, 414, and 415, Congress took advantage of
its power to propose evidentiary rules and bypass the Rules Enabling
Act. 55 On September 13, 1994, Congress enacted Rules 413, 414, and
415 as a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994. 56 The sponsors' goals were to increase the prosecution and
conviction rate of people engaged in sexual misconduct and to make it
easier for victims of such misconduct to bring civil actions to vindicate
their rights. The new rules, developed without evaluation by the
Advisory Committee, were soundly criticized by lawyers, the ABA,
Nevertheless, Congress passed the rules
judges, and scholars. 57
resoundingly after very little debate. 58
Rules 413 and 414 were touted by proponents as major tools for
bringing rapists and child molesters to justice and criticized by opponents
55.
The sexual character evidence rules, 412, 413, 414, and 415, are an example
of the politicization of the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules were not recommended
by the Supreme Court, but were initiated in Congress in response to concerns about
particular kinds of cases. David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1995). Political tinkering with rules is
not limited to the rules of evidence. Ronald Levin notes that prominent civil procedure
scholars have expressed misgivings about the role of special interests groups in inducing
Congress to modify the rules of civil procedure. Ronald M. Levin, Administrative
Procedure Legislation in 1946 and 1996: Should We Be Jubilant at This Jubilee?, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 55, 61 (1996) (citing Paul D. Carrington, The New Order and
Judicial Rulemaking, 15 JUDICATURE 161, 165 (1991)); see also Richard L. Marcus, Of
Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761,
817-18 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics ofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 844-51 (1991).
56.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, §320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994).
57.
The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts solicited comments from lawyers,
judges, scholars and interested organizations on Rules 413-415. Eighty-eight individuals
opposed the rules and seven supported them. Twelve organizations opposed the rules,
while three supported them. The primary reasons stated for opposition were that the rules
were unfair (58 responding), had drafting problems (47 responding) and contained
insufficient data on propensity (33 responding). The Judicial Conference of the United
States reported to Congress that the overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law
professors and legal organizations opposed the new rules. Report of the Judicial
Conference on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases,
159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) [hereinafter Report of Judicial Conference]. The Conference
also reported that, except for the representatives of the Department of Justice, the
Advisory Committees on Criminal and Civil Rules and the Standing Committee
.
unanimously opposed the new rules. /d. at 53.
58.
See 140 Cong. Rec. H8968-01, H8990 (Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) ("The rule changes in this bill are based on a Senate amendment that was offered
on the floor of the Senate and had maybe 20 minutes of debate. It is procedurally and
substantively flawed. There has been no debate on the potentially enormous impact it
would have on civil or criminal cases.").
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as imperiling the presumption of innocence. Rule 415, making sexual
character evidence admissible in a civil case, appears to have been an
afterthought. 59 There is little explicit mention of Rule 415 in the
congressional debate. Nowhere in the legislative history is there any
discussion of either how these rules would be used in civil cases, or what
kinds of cases would benefit from this kind of evidence. 00 It apparently
seemed fair to allow victims to use prior acts of sexual assault and
molestation in damage suits against their rapists and child molesters. 61
The implementation date for Rules 413, 414, and 415 was delayed
to allow 150 days for the Judicial Conference of the United States to
comment and propose alternative rules if necessary. 62 The Judicial
Conference submitted its report to Congress on February 9, 1995
opposing the rules63 and suggesting that if Congress deemed such rules
necessary, they should be redrafted to adopt a flexible approach that
would give judges greater authority to exclude the evidence. 64 Congress
ignored the report, and the rules as previously enacted became effective
on July 9, 1995.
At the same time that Congress was considering rules to allow
admission of sexual character evidence to prove action in conformity with
59.
Wright and Graham refer to its inclusion as "cynical opportunism." The
authors believe that these rules are merely the opening salvos of the Justice Department
to get rid of the Rule 404 character bar. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note II, §
5412B (referring to sections 5412 and 5412A).
60.
Unlike amended Rule 412, Rules 413, 414, and 415 were not a part of the
Violence Against Women Act, nor were they ever part of a "feminist agenda." Senator
Biden, the primary sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act, argued strenuously
against these rules, but in the end agreed to their inclusion over protest in order to get the
bill passed. In debate over the rules, Senator Biden stated:
Now remember, I'm the guy who authored the Violence Against Women Act.
It has been my crusade for the past 4 years to have violence against women
taken seriously. . . . I, too, want to see more rapists and child abusers put
behind bars. But not at the price of fairness. And not at the expense of what
we know in our hearts to be right and just.
141 CONG. REc. Sl0966-07, S10967 (July 31, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
Senator Biden recognized that the rules would be a part of the bill. He said for the
record: "Of everything in this crime bill, the only thing that I have a moral, intellectual,
and practical aversion to is this last provision [Rules 413, 414, and 415]." 140 CONG.
REc. S12250-02, S12261 (Aug. 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
61.
The inclusion of Rule 415 is described as "a fraudulent afterthought that
someone in the Justice Department thought might appeal to feminists who might not
otherwise support amendments to the criminal rules that would undermine recent changes
to rule 412." 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5412B (referring to sections 5412
and 5412A).
Report of Judicial Conference, supra note 57, at 51.
62.
/d. at 54.
63.
64.
/d.
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prior acts, Congress also considered changes in the federal rape-shield law
(Rule 412) to ensure that sexual character evidence of a victim was
inadmissible. Plaintiffs charging sexual misconduct were routinely asked
about former rapes, childhood abuse, abortions, venereal disease, and
even whether they had sex with animals or watched x-rated movies. 65
Their sexual fantasies were fodder for courtroom testimony and extensive
discovery. 66 The defendant might argue to the fact fmder that the
plaintiff "invited his attention," or imply as subtext that she did not
deserve protection. Essentially, defendants using such invasive tactics
were urging judges and juries to indulge their bias that she "invited it."
They looked to evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct in the hope that
the fact finder would infer that because an alleged victim was sexually
active she should not be believed, or because the alleged victim showed
an interest in sexual matters, she probably consented to or welcomed the
defendant's sexual approaches. 67 The original Rule 412 did nothing to
protect plaintiffs in such situations. As a result, plaintiffs often dropped
their suits to avoid these probing inquiries into their private lives.
When considering whether the Rule 412 shield should apply in civil
actions, Congress had the benefit of the Advisory Committee's
recommendations. Not only did the Advisory Committee address chronic
problems with the criminal application of Rule 412, it also recommended
the extension of the rule to civil actions. 68 Although this change was
initially rejected by the Supreme Court, Congress ensured that the civil
application of Rule 412 was included by adopting it in the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 69
65.
Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy: Plaintiffs' Sex Lives Are
Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al.
66.
See, e.g., Meritor Sav: Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that
sexual fantasies and dress were relevant to determining whether the conduct was welcome
in a sexual harassment case).
In the worst cases, jurors appeared to believe that women who violated rigid
67.
norms about appropriate sexual conduct did not deserve to recover even if a violation
could be proven. Estrich, supra note 43, at 846.
·
68.
This may have been an effort to head off a congressional initiative. Congress
was considering an amendment to the rule which would have extended it to civil actions,
and which was more stringent than that proposed by the Advisory Committee. 23
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5382 (Supp. 1997).
69.
Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994). The Judicial Conference
opposed the rule's extension to civil cases. When offered the Advisory Committee's
recommended changes, the Supreme Court accepted the changes to the criminal aspect of
the rule but rejected its civil application. In a letter to the chair of the Judicial
Conference, Justice Rehnquist explained that several Justices believed the amendment
would violate the Rules Enabling Act. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, at V (1994). The
Act precludes the Court from promulgating rules that modify substantive law. See Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Justices were of the opinion that the
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Even though the changes in Rules 412, 413, 414, and 415 were a
part of the same piece of legislation, 70 they were designed to mollify

extension of the rule to civil applications would substantially alter a defense in workplace
sexual harassment cases. H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, supra. The federal judiciary has
concurrent jurisdiction over court procedure because Congress delegated that authority
through the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072. Though the Act precludes the
Court from promulgating rules that modify substantive law, Congress is not limited in its
ability to change substantive law. In order to avoid what was perceived to be a change in
substantive law, the Supreme Court transmitted the rule to Congress as a rule for criminal
sexual misconduct cases, not for civil cases. H.R. Doc. No. 103-250, supra, at 1-3. In
Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court had said that an alleged victim's sexually
provocative speech or dress was relevant to determine if alleged sexually harassing
behavior was welcome. 477 U.S. at 68. The proposed rule arguably would make such
evidence presumptively inadmissible since it constitutes evidence of "sexual
predisposition." See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. The revised rule became
law effective December 1, 1994, pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Supreme
.
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
Congress was dissatisfied with the deletion. The Advisory Committee had described
the extension of the rule to civil matters as "obvious," noting that a person's privacy
interest does not disappear simply because the litigation involves a claim of damages or
injunctive relief rather than a criminal prosecution. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) advisory
committee's note. Ruling evidence of the victim's prior sexual history inadmissible would
further the goal of Congress to crack down on sexual misconduct. See id. Congress
proceeded to pass the civil component of the rule that had been deleted by the Supreme
Court as a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37, to take effective December 1, 1994. As ultimately
enacted, Rule 412 is identical to the version originally proposed by the Advisory
Committee, though it was adopted through two separate rule-making processes. This calls
into question whether Congress impliedly abrogated the defense of "welcomeness." In
sexual harassment cases, to determine the probative value of evidence of dress and
conversations in a workplace, courts have to interpret the current state of the law
concerning "welcomeness." Much has been written to criticize the Meritor position that
a plaintiff's dress, speech and lifestyle should be taken into consideration when evaluating
whether workplace sexual harassment was "welcome." Christina A. Bull, The

Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment Pillintiff's Speech and Dress
in the Aftermath ofMeritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L. REV. 117 (1993);
Estrich, supra note 43; Susan Deller Ross, Proving Seiual Harassment: The Hurdles, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 1451 (1992); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual
Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621
(1997). Like evidence of consent in criminal prosecutions for rape, this dress, speech and
lifestyle evidence shifts the focus from the offender's actions to the victim's behavior and
character. One reading of Congress's action in the face of the Supreme Court's concern
is that by legislative fiat "welcomeness" is no longer an issue in sexual harassment cases.
For a detailed discussion of the possible changes that the adoption of amended Rule 412
may have had on the defense of welcomeness see Jacqueline H. Sloan, Extending Rape
Shield Protection to Sexual Harassment Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412
Undermines Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. U. L. REv 363 (1996); see also 23
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5385.1.
70.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37.
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very different political groups. The amendments to the rape-shield law
(Rule 412) originated in the Violence Against Women Act, advocated by
Senator Biden and feminist groups for three years before it.finally passed
as a part of the crime bill. The rules that allowed evidence of prior acts
of sexual assault and child molestation (Rules 413 and 414) origiu.ated
with Republican members of Congress as a part of a "get tough on
crime" attitude manifested in the crime bi11.71 However, there were
some common interests. The proponents of Rule 412 and Rule 415 both
recognized that the rules as they presently existed worked to the
disadvantage of victims of sexual misconduct, and that what was needed
was a change in the approach toward sexual character evidence.
IV. JUDICIAL REsPONSES TO ELIMINATION OF THE CHARACTER BAR
A basic axiom of evidence law is that the judge is charged with
determining relevance. The judge also weighs probative value against
prejudicial effect. Nowhere is the concern about unfair prejudice greater
than when the admission of evidence risks luring the fact finder into
arriving at a decision based on improper considerations. 72 General
propensity arguments are certain to draw objections that the evidence is
more prejudicial than probative.73 There are two schools of thought
71.
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Violence Against
Women Act see Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet:
The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996).
72.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this kind of prejudice in Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In a case in which a crime was predicated on
conviction of a prior felony, the Court found that a district court abuses its discretion
under Rule 403 when it fails to accept a defendant's offer to concede the prior felony
conviction. ld. at 647. In Old Chief, the district court had allowed, over the defendant's
objection, the admission of the name and nature of the prior conviction. /d. at 648.
According to the Supreme Court, the admission of that evidence violated a fundamental
tenet of evidence law that prohibits the use of evidence of a defendant's character to
establish his probability of guilt. Id. at 650. Because the evidence was merely an element
of the offense, and knowledge by the jury of the subject matter of the offense was not
necessary, the Court found that the prosecution should have accepted the defendant's offer
to stipulate. /d. at 655. The Court noted, however, that if the evidence has multiple
u(ility, a finding of Rule 403 unfair prejudice may be inappropriate. /d.
· 73.
Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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among commentators about whether Rule 403 applies. 74 A minority of
commentators argue that Rules 413-415 require admission of relevant
prior sexual misconduct irrespective of other rules. 75 This argument
centers on the rule's use of the language "is admissible," which suggests
that if evidence is relevant, it is admissible without regard for other rules
of evidence, such as the hearsay bar or Rule 403. 76 The argument is
supported by an inference of congressional intent drawn from Congress's
failure to accept the Judicial Conference's recommendation that Congress
address these issues through amendments to already existing rules.77
Proponents of mandatory admissibility claim that in enacting these rules
Congress resolved concerns about prejudice to the defendant. If a court
adopts this mandatory approach to the rules, arguably a plaintiff need only
74.
For a discussion of the issue of whether other rules of evidence limit Rule 415
see John W. McBee, Federal Rule of Evidence 4i5: Making it Work, 36 WASHBURN L.J.
89 (1996).
75.
The Report of the Judicial Conference states that many commentators on the
rules interpreted them to be mandatory. Report of Judicial Conference, supra note 57,
at 53; see also James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts
of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad idea, 157 F.R.D. 95
(1995); James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 4i3 to 4i5-Some Problems and
Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753 (1995).
76.
The federal rules use the language "is admissible" in only one other place in
the body of the rules: Rule 402, which states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by ... these rules
. . . . " FED. R. EVID. 402. Rule 402 thus appears to mandate admission but for the
listed exceptions. Rule 415 lists no exception, hence the argument that no exceptions
apply. Although "is admissible" is stronger than the typical Federal Rules language of
"may," the Federal Rules use the language "shall be admitted" when making explicit that
Rule 403 does not apply. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). For a discussion of these problems
of language, see generally WRIGHT AND GRAHAM, supra note 11, §5411 (Supp. 1997).
77.
The Judicial Conference's recommendations were offered as amendments to
Rule 404 and 405. The report outlined the goals of the proposed amendments to:
(1) expressly apply the other rules of evidence to evidence offered
under the new rules;
(2) expressly allow the party against whom such evidence is offered
to use similar evidence in rebuttal;
(3) expressly enumerate the factors to be weighed by a court in
making its Rule 403 determination;
(4) render the notice provisions consistent with the provisions in
existing Rule 404 regarding criminal eases;
(5) eliminate the special notice provisions of Rules 413-415 in civil
cases so that notice will be required as provided in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(6) permit reputation or opinion evidence after sucli evidence is
offered by the accused or defendant.
Report of Judicial Conference, supra note 57, at 54.
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meet the low threshold created by the relevance requirement for such
evidence to be admitted. 78
Alternatively, critics of the mandatory admissibility position note that
such a literal reading would open the door for evidence that is unreliable,
inflammatory, confusing, or a waste of time. 79 They argue that a more
realistic reading of the rule makes admission of prior sexual offenses
presumptive rather than mandatory, and subject to such other rules of
evidence as 403, hearsay, best evidence, and limitations on expert
opinion. This position also finds support in the legislative history. In
response to concerns about mandatory admissibility, the sponsors of this
portion of the legislation assured congressional members that the new
rules would be subject to Rule 403's balancing test. 80 However, they
also said that: "The underlying legislative judgment is that the evidence
admissible pursuant to the proposed rules is typically relevant and
probative, and that its probative value is normally not outweighed by any
risk of prejudice or other adverse effects. " 81 Most courts encountering
evidence offered under these rules have found Rule 403 applicable. 82
When asked about Rule 415, federal judges have responded that they
will not admit such general propensity evidence, and that they would
readily sustain Rule 403 objections. 83 Congress drafted Rule 415 in such
78.
FED. R. EviD. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
See, e.g., Duane, supra note 75.
79.
80.
See 140 CONG. REc. Sl2990-01 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994); 140 CONG. REC.
H8968-0l, H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari) ("In other
respects, the general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including
the restrictions on hearsay evidence and the court's authority under evidence rule 403 to
exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect."); see also Karp, supra note 41, at 19 (this address to the Evidence section of the
Association of American Law Schools on January 9, 1993 was incorporated in the
Congressional Record as a part of the official legislative history).
81.
140 CONG. REc. at H8992 (statement of Rep. Molinari).
82.
See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997)(finding the
Rule 403 analysis of evidence offered under Rule 414 consistent with congressional
intent); United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding Rule 403
applicable); United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.M. 1997) (Rule 403
balancing appropriate when considering Rule 413); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'! Management
Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (Rule 403 applicable to Rule 415 evidence);
Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 627 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding 415 evidence
inadmissible under Rule 403); United States v. Jackson, CR. No. 95-388-FR, 1996 WL
444968 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (finding prior acts of sexual misconduct not relevant).
83.
As a faculty member of the Federal Judicial Education Center, I have had the
opportunity to speak with federal magistrate and district court judges about how these
rules apply in civil cases. Most are quite surprised at what the rules are designed to
admit, and frankly state that they would find such evidence more prejudicial than

1997:1221

Sexual Character Evidence in Ovil Actions

1243

a way that arguably leaves a court very little discretion when determining
admissibility. 84 Even if the rule does not limit judicial discretion
entirely, at least it requires the court to be more circumscribed when
finding prejudice. The sponsors of this legislation were aware that judges
might resist. As Susan Molinari, the principal House sponsor, pointed
out:
the practical efficacy of these rules will depend on faithful
execution by judges of the will of Congress in adopting this
critical reform. To implement the legislative intent, the courts
must liberally construe these rules to provide the basis for a
fully informed decision of sexual assault and child molestation
cases, including assessment of the defendant's propensities and
questions of probability in light of the defendant's past
conduct. 85
Applying Rule 403 to sexual character evidence is complicated by
two aspects of Rule 415: first, the probative value of such evidence
might be inflated by Rule 415's allowance that evidence of this type is
admissible for any relevant purpose; and second, one traditional source
of unfair prejudice, that the evidence might be used to show general
propensity, can no longer be considered in the balance. 86 Rule 415 is
not affected by Rule 404's character bar: inferring present behavior from
past bad acts is allowed under Rule 415. Therefore, if the objection to
Rule 415 evidence is based on alleged unfairness caused by the possibility
that the jury would find the defendant liable based on a general propensity
probative because the rules allow propensity evidence. Informal Survey of Federal
Magistrate Judges, National Training Conference, in Denver, CO (July 1997); Discussion
with 4th Circuit Judge at ALI-ABA workshop on evidence issues, in Charleston, S.C.,
(June, 1997).
84.
The Justice Department, anticipating that judges would be reluctant to admit
character evidence, stated, "Entrusting [federal] judges whose attitudes have been formed
by the existing, restrictive rules to implement a fundamentally different approach under
an essentially discretionary standard would ... undermine the basic objective [of the new
rule]." OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLICY, supra note 15, at 760.
85.
140 CONG. REC. at H8992.
86.
Rule 415 precludes arguing as unfairly prejudicial that the defendant is the
kind of person who would do the act alleged. However, a legitimate Rule 403 argument
would assert that the prior act evidence may encourage jurors to punish the accused for
past conduct, or for other crimes they suspect the accused has committed, rather than
focus on the currently alleged conduct to determine if the plaintiff has proven its case.
Distinguishing this nuanced prejudice may be especially difficult when the prior act
evidence concerns such inflammatory crimes as sexual assault or child molestation. See
Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1971).
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theory, a Rule 403 Gbjection should fail because Rule 415 specifically
allows the jury to draw those conclusions. 87
The effect of broadening the basis for establishing probative value
and narrowing the basis for finding unfair prejudice should weaken a Rule
403 objection. Yet, other than stranger rape or child molestation cases,
in every reported case where the proponent has offered evidence that
relies on the broad definition of sexual assault, the courts have sustained
403 objections. 88 Similarly, although the rule specifically permits "bad
character" evidence, judges resist, and most do not allow sexual character
evidence offered for general propensity purposes in civil cases. 89 Rule
415 is meaningless if it cannot be used to allow admission of character
evidence. 90
In Frank v. County of Hudson, 91 a sexual harassment action brought
by employees of the Sheriffs's Office against the County of Hudson, the
Sheriffs Office and several officials, the defendants sought a protection
order to preclude the plaintiffs from using the statement of a defendant
supervisor's stepdaughter that he·had sexually abused her for nearly ten
years. 92 The plaintiffs, whose allegations against this supervisor
87.
See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 584 (1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 955 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D.N.M. 1997)
88.
(Rule 403 balancing appropriate when considering Rule 413); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l
Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (Rule 403 applicable to Rule 415
evidence); Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 627 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding
415 evidence inadmissible under Rule 403); United States v. Jackson, CR. No. 95-388FR, 1996 WL 444968 (D. Or. July 22, 1996) (finding prior acts of sexual misconduct not
relevant). By contrast, when the cases are based on allegations of rape or child
molestation and the prior act evidence is rape or child molestation, the courts have
admitted the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997)
(similar sexual acts with children some 16-20 years prior admissible to prove present
molestation); United States v. Akram, No. 97 CR 78, 1997 WL 392220 (N.D. lll. July
8, 1997) (other acts of sexual assault during same time period admissible to prove sexual
assault on two minors).
See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997) (in a
89.
prosecution for criminal sexual assault, evidence indicating defendant had previously
assaulted young girls not admissible because general propensity evidence is unfairly
prejudicial); Guardia, 955 F. Supp. at 115 (testimony of other witnesses alleging
inappropriate acts during a gynecological exam not admissible under Rule 403); Frank,
924 F. Supp. at 620 (discussed infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text); Shea v. Galaxie
Lumber & Constr. Co., No. 94 C 906, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2904 (N.D. lll. Mar. 12,
1996) (Rule 403 requires exclusion of sexual character evidence).
90.
If one could articulate a non-character justification for the prior acts evidence,
then presumably the evidence would be admissible under Rule 404(b ). This would render
Rule 415 superfluous.
91.
924 F. Supp. 620 (1996).
92.
/d. at 622.
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included claims that he forced them to view him masturbating, and that
he sexually touched the plaintiffs' buttocks, made gratuitous sexual
comments, and intimidated them through the use of a shotgun,93 offered
a number of theories of relevance for the stepdaughter's statement. These
included the general propensity of the supervisor to engage in sexual
assaults, the supervisor's motive and intent, and his supervisors' prior
knowledge of his conduct. 94 The court assigned a low degree of
probative value to these theories95 and stated there was a great risk of
unfair prejudice. 96 The prejudice that the court identified was the
emotional response that child sexual abuse is likely to elicit in a trier of
fact. In issuing the protective order, the court said, "And the potential
for unfair prejudice if the evidence were admitted at trial. is great. The
purpose of the evidence rules' general prohibition against propensity
evidence is to address the danger that a jury might convict the defendant
not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense presented. " 97
This court's reasoning is inconsistent with the mandates of Rule 415.
Instead of crediting the use of character evidence in its analysis of
probative value, the court discounts those theories. It also heightens Rule
403 concerns by focusing on the prejudicial effect of the prior acts
evidence. 98 The court's analysis suggests that evidence of prior sexual
assault must be relevant on some other ground than character. This is the
underlying reasoning for Rule 404(b), and would add little, if anything,
to that traditional analysis. 99 The court's interpretation effectively
eviscerates Rule 415. However, the legislative history of Rules 413 and
414 indicates that Congress d~ided that the risks of generally allowing
sexual character evidence were overshadowed by the need to crack down
on crimes of sexual abuse. Congress adopted the rule despite being
93.
/d.
94.
/d. at 625-26.
95.
/d. at 626.
96.
924 F. Supp. at 626-27.
97.
/d. at 627.
98.
There are other kinds of prejudice beyond "propensity prejudice." Here the
court appears to be giving weight to what might be called "nullification prejudice."
Nullification prejudice occurs when the jury is so swayed by the evidence of the
defendant's bad conduct that it ceases to care whether he committed the act in question.
With the passage of Rule 415, courts will be asked to make a fine distinction when
assessing prejudice: it is prejudice when the jury would likely find liability based on the
prior acts despite the lack of evidence on the present charge. It is not prejudice when the
jury uses the prior acts to assess whether the person actually did the present act.
99.
See supra note 26.
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warned by the Judicial Conference that this was an ill-advised and
fundamental alteration of traditional principles and standards. 100
Another example of a court negating the intent of Rule 415 is found
in United States v. Guardia, 101 a criminal case against a physician
charged with criminal sexual penetration and simple battery. arising from
gynecological examinations of two patients. The government sought to
introduce the testimony of four other women who alleged similar acts of
inappropriate touching during their gynecological examinations. 102 The
defense maintained that no such sexual activity occurred. The prosecution
argued that such evidence was admissible under Rule 413 to show that the
defendant has "'an on-going disposition to commit sexual assaults against
his female patients. "' 103 The court granted the defendant's motion in
limine stating:
[T]he Court believes it is more appropriate to interpret Rule
413, like the other Rules of Evidence, to "secure fairness in
administration, eiimination of unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined." Fed. R. Evid. 102. These
goals would not be served by allowing six rather than two
witnesses to testify as to how they believe Defendant sexually
assaulted them and, more importantly, subjecting the jury to the
expert testimony necessary for it to determine the legal
significance of such testimony by each 413 witness. 104
The court's reasoning appears to undercut the purpose of Rule 413
(the criminal analogue of Rule 415). Here the prosecution was offering
prior acts of the defendant substantially similar to the acts alleged. The
defense contended that inappropriate acts never occurred. 105 The court
100.
The language the court uses in Frank reveals the concern for general
propensity. A better tack for the court to have taken without violating the intent of Rule
415 would have been to deny the relevance of the evidence because it was not sufficiently
similar to the alleged acts to fall within Rule 415. If Rule 415 is narrowed in the ways
that I suggest, see infra part V.B.I, this case would probably reach the same result.
955 F. Supp. 115 (D.N.M. 1997).
101.
/d. at 116.
102.
103.
Id at 119 (quoting the Government's Response to Defendant's Motion in
Limine).
104.
Id. at 119-120.
105.
The "doctrine of chances" undergirds this use of general propensity evidence.
See Edward J. hnwinkelried, The Dispute over the Doctrine of Chances: Relying on the

Concept of Relative Frequency to Admit Uncharged Misconduct Evidence,
16 (1992) (discussing and clarifying the doctrine of chances).
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did not specifically argue that it would not admit character evidence
because it offends the character bar but rather alluded to the potential for
confusion and delay. 106 Such an argument might have more force if the
evidence were dissimilar, but here the evidence was of the same sort as
that alleged in the criminal complaint. Given Rule 413 's broad mandate
of admissibility, as well as the similarity of the prior acts, their proximity
in time, and repetitive nature, the required showing under Rule 403-that
the unfair prejudice outweigh the probative value-was not satisfied. The
court's concern about confusion appeared to be grounded in the fear that
the trier of fact might use the other acts to determine whether the
defendant engaged in the present act, in other words, to show general
propensity under Rule 413. 107
Finally, in Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 108 a
sexual harassment case, the defendant moved that the plaintiff be
precluded from admitting any evidence of prior sexual misconduct of her
former manager, an employee of KFC. 109 The defendant argued that
the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 415, and that even if it were
admissible, its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative
value. 110 After finding that Rule 415 did apply to these facts and that
it was admissible against the company through respondeat superior, 111
106.
Because the case turned on whether the defendant's acts were medically
appropriate, expert opinion was necessary. The court noted that for each witness further
expert testimony would be required. The court noted that the witnesses would interject
"confusingly similar, but potentially distinguishable, legal issues into the trial," and said,
"This would essentially create a trial within a trial with regard to allegations by nonprosecuting witnesses, related to actions for which Defendant is not charged." Guardia,
955 F. Supp. at 118.
I07.
This case could have been decided by finding the evidence of prior acts to be
offered for a non-character purpose, that is, to show that the defendant intended to engage
in sexual assault in his examinations. This suggests an irony in the application of Rule
403. Prejudice depends on the badness of the act, not whether it is character or noncharacter evidence. Thus, the only thing that distinguishes evidence prohibited by Rule
404 from evidence permitted (subject to Rule 403) by Rule 404 is the low probative value
of the former. The congressional judgment underlying Rules 413-415 must have been that
despite the relatively low probative value of sexual assault character evidence (compared
with sexual assault non-character evidence), this type of character evidence has sufficient
probative value to make it potentially admissible. If implementing the congressional intent
requires some relaxation of, or presumption against, Rule 403 concerns with regard to
character evidence in sexual assault cases, it would seem appropriate to take the same
approach to non-character evidence in such cases. It would seem anomalous to have a
more rigorous Rule 403 test for non-character (i.e., more probative) sexual assault
evidence than for character sexual assault evidence.
108.
948 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
109.
/d. at 62-63.
110.
/d. at 64.
111.
/d. at 65.
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the court turned to the Rule 403 analysis. The evidence the plaintiff
sought to introduce was not described in specific detail but was
characterized as "inflammatory." 112 The court instructed the plaintiff
that if she wished to admit the evidence of the agent's misconduct, the
evidence "must be both probative in that it proves corporate knowledge
of similar misconduct and it must corroborate plaintiff's story; otherwise,
the prejudicial effect on the jury is not substantially outweighed. " 113
Evidence of "notice" to the employer would be admissible under Rule
404(b). Corroboration, on the other hand, would not be admissible unless
under Rule 415 since it would be character evidence. By using the
conjunction "and" in its instruction to the parties regarding the effect of
Rule 403, the court required the evidence to be used for non-propensity
purposes, thereby gutting Rule 415.
In each of these cases, the court's interpretation of how 403
balancing affects Rules 413 and 415 is inconsistent with the plain meaning
of the rule. Congress can enact rules of evidence that deprive judges of
discretionary authority. The fact that such rules can result in what'
otherwise might be "unfair prejudice" does not invalidate the rule. In
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine, 114 for example, an injured worker
brought a products liability action against a manufacturer after the
worker's arm was severed while he was working at a car wash. The
plaintiff was employed while on work release from the county prison.
The defendant cross-examined the plaintiff about prior felony convictions
for burglary under then-rule 609(a)(1), which allowed impeachment with
prior convictions without any balancing of unfair prejudice against
probative value. · After a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff
appealed. The plaintiff argued that Rule 609 should be subject to the
Rule 403 balancing test. He cited as unfair prejudice·the fact that the jury
might use the burglary convictions to decide he was a "bad man," not
worthy of compensation, rather than to assess veracity. The Court
recognized that such mandatory admission might produce some unjust
results, but held that mandating admission was the plain meaning of the
rule. 115 The Advisory Committee responded to the concerns raised in
Green by amending Rule 609 to ensure that there would be traditional
Rule 403 balancing when determining admissibility of prior convictions
for impeachment purposes. 116
112.
/d. at 66.
113.
948 F. Supp. at 66.
114.
490 u.s. 504 (1989).
115.
/d. at 527.
116.
Rule 609(a) as amended now reads, "For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable
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When judicial decisions applying Rule 415 117 find their way to the
Supreme Court, the Court could find that the plain meaning of Rule 415
precludes the application of any other rule; and thus that Rule 403
balancing is inappropriate. 118 It is not likely the Court will go that far.
It could find that Rule 403 balancing is allowed when applying Rule 415
but that general propensity concerns are, by the terms of the rule, not
necessarily unfairly prejudicial. Any finding that Rule. 403 prevents
admission must be based on more limited concerns of waste of time or
confusion. 119 This would have the probable effect of forcing judges to
admit the evidence despite their reservations about the fairness of using
sexual character evidence. 120 Any change in that outcome would have
to come from Congress.

by death or imprisonment in excess of one year .... " FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (emphasis
added).
I am focusing on the possible challenge to the civil application of these rules.
117.
Rules 413 and 414 might raise significant constitutional problems in their criminal
application. See infra notes 124-25, 132 and accompanying text. Those constitutional
concerns do not arise in a civil case.
118.
This would be consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion in Green, in which he
eschews looking at legislative history; i.e., committee reports and statements of a handful
of legislators, but instead looks to the plain language of the rule. Green, 490 U.S. at 52939; see also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. Since 1995, the Supreme Court
has shifted away from a pure textualist approach to the interpretation of the Federal Rules.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for
a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 331 (1995).
119.
Even arguments of staleness may be precluded from Rule 403 consideration.
See United States. v. Meachnm, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (lOth Cir. 1997) (evidence of acts
of molestation of step daughters thirty years prior admissible under Rule 414 in
prosecution for transporting a minor across state lines with intent to engage in sexual
activity).
120.
The dissenters in Green argued that Rule 609's drafters intended to ignore
these reservations, but remained concerned about the admission of evidence that has the
"danger of improperly infiuencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact
to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record." Green, 490 U.S. at
532 (Biackmun, J., dissenting).
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V. REFINING THE PROPENSITY RULE

A. Policy Considerations
1. THE CRIMINAL ANALOGY
Normally, evidence that is probative is admissible, unless there is
a policy reason to exclude it. 121 One such reason has been the concern ·
about general propensity evidence, but it has never been an absolute bar.
Evidence of prior acts has been increasingly accepted under the rubric of
Rule 404(b), 122 but courts have required a showing (even if fictional)
that such evidence has not been offered for pure propensity purposes. 123
Allowing explicit character arguments elicits vigorous criticism from
scholars and lawyers. The majority of this criticism focuses on the use
of character evidence in criminal cases; it does not address the use of
sexual character evidence in civil cases. Nevertheless, such concerns
should not be taken lightly when refining something as formidable as the
character bar.
Character evidence presents several practical problems in the criminal
context that carry less force in civil proceedings. First, as critics have
noted, routinely admitting evidence of prior misconduct similar to
charged conduct exacerbates the law-enforcement tendency to "round up
the usual suspects. " 124 A defendant might have become a suspect
merely because of his prior acts, not necessarily because he matched a
121.
Rule 402 states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
FED. R. EVID. 402.
122.
See supra note 26.
123.
Courts often admit character evidence asserting that it does not offend the
general propensity bar when, in fact, its relevance is purely character-based. See Roger
C. Park, Character Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson Case-Or, Rationales of the
Character Evidence Ban, with fllustrationsfrom the Simpson Case, 61 U. COLO. L. REv.
747 (1996); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: fllusion,
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 (1982).
124.
SeeKatharineK. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy
in Rape Law, II 0 HARV. L. REv. 563 ( 1997). People with histories of child molestation
or sexual assault are likely to be members of photo arrays or lineups from which victims
are asked to choose. There has been a great deal of social science literature to suggest
that these identification procedures can be quite suggestive. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F.
LoFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory, in
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 12 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
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description given by the victim. To then allow evidence of his prior acts
of misconduct to indicate that he was more likely to have committed the
present crime compounds the potential for convicting a wrongly identified
man. 125 The plaintiff in a sexual misconduct case knows and can
identify the defendant, so the risk of misidentification reinforced by
admission of prior misconduct, present in criminal cases, is not a concern
in the civil setting. 126 Second, such evidence adds complexity to
trials. 127 However, in a civil case, unlike its criminal counterpart, the
defendant has much more power to structure his defense to limit the
relevance of certain evidence.
On the other hand, the use of character evidence in a civil context
still prompts several concerns. For example, some of the protections built
into the criminal process are not present in a civil case. Consider the
ways a victim of a crime, drawn into a criminal prosecution, might differ
from a plaintiff seeking personal redress. Rule 412 is to be invoked by
a person characterized as an "alleged victim of sexual misconduct. " 128
The victim of a crime will have already been vindicated by an indictment,
whereas the plaintiff in a civil action must self-certify her status as the
"alleged victim." The defendant in a criminal case may have his defense
paid for by the state, and is entitled to constitutional protections. Neither
125.
Given police procedures, this is likely to have a disparate impact on poor men
of color. Baker, supra note 124, at 593; Developments in the Law-Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1495 (1988). Critics note with relief that
because these are federal rules, there will be few instances in which they will be applied,
since criminal law is uniquely a state endeavor. There are very few federal prosecutions
for sexual assault and child molestation. Harvey Berkman, Crime Bill Sex Rule Stirs
Evidence Debate, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at A-16. But these prosecutions are likely
to disproportionately affect Native Americans and persons on federal enclaves since they
are subject to federal criminal jurisdiction. /d.
126.
Bryden and Park make the point that in acquaintance-rape cases, a criminal
action roughly analogous to claims of sexual harassment, the cumulative uncharged
misconduct evidence is "usually extraordinarily credible." Bryden & Park, supra note
15, at 577. They note that credibility derives from the fact that the risk of an honestly
mistaken accusation is negligible, and the danger of deliberately false accusations is
reduced by the intrusiveness of the investigation and the prospect that the defense will
attack the complainant. /d. Roger Park has also noted the absence of this problem with
respect to Rules 413-415 when dealing with the consent defense because there is no
dispute that sexual contact has occurred. Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the
Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 273 (1995).
127.
Typically, criminal defendants do not have the resources to defend the
charged conduct, much less the mini-trials on prior misconduct that Rules 413 and 414
would require. Such mini-trials increase the time and cost of trials, and may result in
confusion within the jury as a court goes far afield of the events that are the subject of the
present prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 412.
128.
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of those benefits are available to the defendant in a civil case. However,
these concerns might be overrated in the civil context. Civil plaintiffs,
though not screened for credibility through the indictment process, are
subject to summary judgment motions and Rule 11 sanctions. The mere
filing of a lawsuit is costly and difficult. Those factors alone might act as
an equivalent to certification of "alleged victim" status in a criminal
case. The defendants in civil cases might not have access to a paid-for
defense, but they are far less likely to be indigent. Indeed, such civil
actions are unlikely to be brought against penniless defendants. 129
Critics argue that the admission of sexual character evidence violates
fundamental notions of due process 130 and the presumption of
innocence. 131 In the criminal setting, there is some case support for
such criticism. 132 In a civil setting, this criticism carries less weight
because the concerns that underlie an accusatorial system of justice are
129.
Typically, in a criminal case, the prosecution has the bulk of the resources
to move the case forward, and the defendant is often the party of lesser means. The
reverse is usually true in civil actions.
130.
See Duane, supra note 75; Stephen R. Henley, Caveat Criminale: The Impact

of the New Military Rules of Evidence in Sexual Offense and Child Molestation Cases,
ARMY LAW., Mar. 1996, at 82, 89; Natali & Stigall, supra note 18; Mark A. Sheft,
Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57,
67 (1995). Furthermore, critics argue that the admission and use of such evidence
requires an irrational and arbitrary inference when offered to prove that the defendant
committed the act charged. Edward Imwinkelried suggests that since the rule targets
recidivists, it may require heightened scrutiny. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small

Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character
Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125 (1993).
131.
See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Jeffrey G. Pickett, The
Presumption ofInnocence Imperiled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the
Use of Other Sexual Offense Evidence in Washington, 10 WASH. L. REV. 883 (1995).
Research has indicated that admission of this kind of evidence significantly increases the
chance of a finding of guilt and undermines the presumption of innocence. HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 174 (1966). Ironically, we tolerate
the use of prior-act evidence through the introduction of past convictions to impeach, even
though common wisdom and social science literature suggest that juries do not follow
limiting instructions. See, e.g., Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove
Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 Crim. L. Bull. 504, 525 (1991); A.N. Doob
& H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM L.Q. 88, 90 (1972); Roselle L. Wissler &
Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37
.
(1985).
132.
See Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995); United States v. Has No Horse, 11
F.3d 104 (8th Cir. 1993); Government of Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180 (3d
Cir. 1993); Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
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not present. 133 There is no presumption of innocence except insofar as
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The defendants in civil cases do
not face the threat of incarceration, or other deprivations of liberty or the
stigma attached to a criminal prosecution. They are not prosecuted by the
state. Civil actions provide an opportunity for vindication of private
rights. It might be inappropriate to allow the state to lessen its burden of
proof in order to fight crime. However, it is another matter when the
victim herself seeks to vindicate her rights. Nevertheless, there is an
underlying perception of unfairness in civil court. Sexual character
evidence carries with it a moral condemnation, and one should be wary
of rules that make moral condemnation easier. Arguing that the defendant
is a bad man and therefore should be found liable in this case might
significantly increase the probability that the plaintiff will prevail, but not
without some cost to the integrity of the judicial system.

2.

THE NEED FOR CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES

There are compelling reasons to admit sexual character evidence.
Critics of character evidence in general suggest that juries tend to
overvalue it, thereby inappropriately shifting the balance against the
defendant. However, plaintiffs in sexual misconduct cases face the
opposite problem: jurors tend not to believe the plaintiffs story unless
they have evidence the defendant has behaved that way before. 134 If the
plaintiff is prohibited from introducing character evidence, juries make the
"Mr. Clean" assumption and are less willing to credit her claims. 135
133.
See, e.g., lA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW§ 55 (3d ed. 1983).
See Roger L. Hutchinson et al., Students' Perceptions of Male Sexually
134.
Aggressive Behavior as a Function of Educational Level and Gender, 30 SEx ROLES 407,
410 (1994); Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual Harassment on the Job: Legal,
Organizational, and Individual Actions, 38(4) J. Soc. ISSUES 5, 6 (1982); see also Karen
Andrews, The Admissibility ofOther-Crimes Evidence in Acquaintance-Rape Prosecutions,
17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 341 (1993); Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecution for
Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307 (1993).
135.
See J. Michael Egbert, Jr., et al., The Effect of Litigant Social Desirability
on Judgements Regarding a Sexual Harassment Case, 7 J. Soc. BEHA v. & PERSONALITY
569, 511 (1992) (finding that while social desirability of both litigants affects verdict,
defendant social desirability alone significantly affected subjects' impression of guilt).
Roger Park discusses the use of character evidence using the regret matrix. The regret
matrix is based on the idea that jurors will seek to minimize their sense of regret over
reaching an incorrect decision. Jurors will anticipate Jess regret if they wrongfully convict
a person they believe has committed other crimes. Park, supra note 126, at 274. Park
notes however, that the regret matrix needs to be re-set in the case of acquaintance rape.
If in acquaintance rape cases jurors are likely to act on conceivable doubts that
are not really reasonable doubts, then re-setting their regret levels can give

1254

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

Without Rule 415, plaintiffs can be hamstrung by being prohibited from
introducing evidence to counter jury bias. 136
Congress singled out sexual assault and child molestation cases
because, unlike other crimes, they often turn on difficult credibility
determinations. 137 The need for victim corroboration particularly arises
in sexual misconduct cases when the parties have known one another. 138
Unlike other offenses, sexual misconduct cases raise the question of
whether the victim consented or welcomed the behavior .139 Sexual
them a more appropriate attitude toward reasonable doubt. There is good
evidence that jurors are prejudiced against the prosecution in consent defense
cases. The admission of evidence about the defendant's prior sexual assaults
may therefore push jurors closer to the right standard of proof.
/d. at 274-75 (citations omitted).
136.
Prior to Rule 415, evidence that the alleged perpetrator had engaged in other
acts of sexnal harassment was often deemed inadmissible as in violation of Rule 404's
character bar. Susan Estrich points out that courts rely on the absence of harassment
complaints to determine if harassment occurred, yet at the same time prevent plaintiffs'
attorneys from questioning female co-workers about such harassment. She cites the lower
court decision in Henson v. City ofDundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1982), in which
the trial judge held against a plaintiff, relying on the fact that the boss had never
propositioned any other workers, after sustaining a relevance objection when the plaintiffs
counsel sought to inquire on that point. Estrich, supra note 43, at 848 n.143.
137.
Representative Molinari described adult-victim sexual assault cases as
"distinctive," saying:
Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an issue in prosecutions for other
violent crimes-the accused mugger does not claim that the victim freely
handed over this [sic] wallet as a gift-but the defendant in a rape case often
contends that the victim engaged in consensual sex and then falsely accused
him. Knowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on other occasions
is frequently critical in assessing the relative plausibility of these claints and
accurately deciding cases that would otherwise become unresolvable swearing
matches.
140 CONG. REC. H8968-01, H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994).
138.
In the past, rape law explicitly required corroboration. That requirement
came under attack by feminists and the necessity of proving corroboration in the
prosecution's case in chief has fomtally disappeared. However, many argue that it now
exists in a more subtle form. Juries in rape cases continue to infomtally require
corroboration even when it is no longer a legal requirement. Martha A. Myers & Gary
D. LaFree, Sexual Assault and Its Prosecution: A Comparison with Other Crimes, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1282, 1300 (1982). Susan Estrich points out that even though
American jurisdictions have abandoned fomtal rules requiring corroboration, evidence that
corroborates the victim's story is still necessary to prove rape or sexnal harassment.
Estrich, supra note 43, at 850.
139.
By contrast, if the complainant had been the victim of robbery, the jury
would not be predisposed to disbelieve her. Robbery also may occur in a clandestine
fashion such that corroborating evidence would be useful to resolve credibility issues.
Treating sex offenses differently from other offenses is justified by at least two
distinctions: first, jurors are predisposed to disbelieve complainants when encountering
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character evidence in such cases provides corroboration for the
complainant. 140 The need for corroboration springs from the belief that
if there is a swearing contest between a man and a woman about whether
there was sexual misconduct occurred, the man will be believed. 141
The need for corroboration does not arise only in sexual assault
cases. Sexual harassment cases also frequently tum on an assessment of
whether the plaintiff welcomed the behavior. 142 Moreover, the plaintiff
is making a charge against a more powerful party: she is frequently a
subordinate bringing a claim against a superior. 143 The alleged harasser
often comes to the lawsuit with the "Mr. Clean" presumption plus the
added respectability of a supervisory or managerial position, increasing
his apparent social desirability and credibility. 144 The result is a jury
claims of sexual misconduct than other types of cases, see HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B.
BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 117-19 (1980); Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to
Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 Soc. PROBS. 389 (1985);
and second, the injury resulting from sex offenses is more serious than that associated
with theft. Beale, supra note 134, at 317.
140.
Sara Sun Beale notes the structural difficulty of proving sexual offenses,
which virtually all occur in private and feature little, if any, corroborative physical
evidence. The eases come down to the complainant's word versus the word of the
defendant and turn on what evidence there may be to resolve the swearing contest. Beale,
supra note 134, at 317.
141.
In the classic jury study by Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, the authors
found that men and women adhered to such myths as "only bad girls get raped;" women
provoke rape by their appearance and behavior; women enjoy violent sex; women charge
rape out of vindictiveness; and rapists are abnormal men without access to consensual sex.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 131, at 249-51. Such beliefs have been confirmed in
modern studies as well. See, e.g., GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 203
(1989) (describing impact of victim behavior on juror assessment of rape). Similar studies
of jurors' beliefs in sexual harassment cases do not appear to be available. Nevertheless,
there are substantial analogies between nonstranger rape eases and sexual harassment that
suggest that similar juror attitudes exist.
142.
The Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings provide perhaps the most noted
example of the need for corroboration in sexual harassment claims. Throughout Anita
Hill's testimony, commentators implied that if this had happened with her, it must have
happened with many others. The absence of the others' testimony cast doubt on her
credibility. MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 321-50.
143.
Social science research reinforces this idea. Sexual liaisons with coworkers
have been found to enhance a man's status in the organization and degrade a woman's
status. Robert E. Quinn, Coping with Cupid: The Formation, Impact and Management
of Romantic Relationships in Organizations, 22 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 30 (1977).
144.
Studies also indicate that the social desirability of the litigant can have a
substantial effect on the outeome of the lawsuit. According to social science research,
social desirability is likely to have impact on the fact finder's assessment of credibility and
might make the difference between finding for the plaintiff and finding for the defendant.
See Egbert et al., supra note 135, at 569.
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predisposed to favor the defendant. 145 If evidence of prior acts of
sexual assault is admitted, it will likely cause the jury to rethink its
assessment of the individual. 146
In sexual harassment cases, the third or fourth woman to experience
.the harassment is often the one who brings the case, 147 and it takes
those other women's testimony to make the plaintiffs story
believable. 148 If jurors learn the alleged perpetrator engaged in similar
unwelcome acts in the past, they still might not believe the plaintiff; they
may even find problems with the stories of other alleged victims. 149 But
145.
This predisposition to favor the alleged perpetrator results in various
strategies for discrediting the alleged victim. Social science research suggests that victims
of sexual offenses face a double bind: jurors tend to believe that a man would not assault
an unattractive victim. Yet, jurors tend to view the attractive victim as having played an
active role in her own assault. Marsha B. Jacobson & Paula M. Popovich, Victim
Attractiveness and Perceptions of Responsibility in an Ambiguous Rape Case, 8 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 100, 103 (1983).
146.
See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims' Allegations of Sexual Assault:
Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 Soc. PROBS. 213 (1991). Recent cases
demonstrate the powerful effect of similar-acts evidence. William Kennedy Smith was
acquitted in the rape case brought against him in 1991. The rules of evidence precluded
admission of three other women's testimony alleging similar experiences. Therefore the
jury could not take these into consideration when evaluating his claim that the sex was
consensual. See generally Beale, supra note 134, at 308; Timothy Clifford, Smith's Case
Promises to Be a Landmark, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1991, at 6. In contrast, Marv Albert,
NBC sportscaster, pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual assault only after the prosecution
offered evidence from another woman alleging that Albert had done similar acts to her.
Despite evidence undermining the credibility of his primary accuser, the corroboration of
the other woman changed the public's opinion of that case and resulted in his willingness
to accept a plea bargain. See generally Matthew Cooper, Marv Goes to the Showers,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1997, at 40; Brooke A. Masters & Mandy Stadtmiller, Surprise

Witness Says Albert Bit Her, Too; Hotel Employee Tells of Two Encounters Resembling
Incident Alleged in Sex Assault Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1997, at Dl.
147.
Estrich, supra note 43, at 849. The existence of more than one accuser may
have fueled the prosecution of Sergeant Major Gene McKinney. One accuser in the case
explained why she tolerated his unwanted advances for a long time. She did not make the
harassment claim until another woman came forward. Jury Hears Tape in Trial on Army
Sex Misconduct, ST. LoUIS POST DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1998, at A3.
148.
See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 1985) (three
other women employees came forward to testify that the same supervisor had repeatedly
harassed them); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 574-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (plaintiff
managed, with the help of other employees, to establish a pattern of sexual harassment
by restaurant owner); Estrich, supra note 43, at 836 (noting that generally only when
sexual harassment is endemic to the workplace and other women come forward can
plaintiffs succeed in establishing that the stated reason for their firing was a pretext).
Unlike milder forms of sexual interaction, there are unambiguous social
149.
norms against sexual bribery, sexual coercion, and sexual assault. Jasmine Tata, The

Structure and Phenomenon of Sexual Harassment: Impact of Category of Sexually
Harassing Behavior, Gender, and Hierarchical Level, 23 J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOL. 199,
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if no reason exists to suggest collusion among the accusers, such
corroborating evidence has a synergistic effect. 150 The fact that such
acts all occurred is independent evidence that confirms the plaintiff's
complaint.
It is often asked in high profile sexual misconduct cases: if what she
says is true, where are all the other women? 151 The common wisdom
is that if a person has harassed someone on the job, then he has done it
frequently. Despite juries' biases that the single report of one victim is
insufficient, prior to Rule 415 a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case
could not present evidence of other acts by the defendant because of the
bar on character evidence. Rule 415 removes the character-evidence bar
for sexual assault cases because such a barrier does not make sense in the
context of sexual misconduct. The rule opens the door to evidence that
can counterbalance biased responses about victim credibility, and thereby
even out the jury's credibility assessment.
It is not a new idea to use the rules of evidence to remedy bias in the
fact finding process. 152 Rule 412 bars the admission of evidence of an
208 (1993).
150.
Wigmore established the term "doctrine of chances" to describe how prior
similar acts are evidence of the improbability that the defendant has been falsely or
mistakenly accused of a crime. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 4.01. The drafters of
the law relied upon the doctrine of chances and offered an example:
"[For example, suppose] the defendant is charged with arson. The defendant
claims that the fire was accidental. The cases routinely permit the prosecutor
to show other acts of arson by the defendant and even nonarson fires at
premises owned by the defendant. In these cases, the courts invoke the
doctrine of chances. The courts reason that as the number of incidents
increases, the objective probability of accident decreases. Simply stated, it is
highly unlikely that a single person would be victimized by so many similar
accidental fires in a short period of time. The coincidence defies common
sense and is too peculiar."
137 CoNG. REc. S3191-02, S3240 (daily ed. March 13, 1991) (alteration in original)
(quoting IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 4.01).
See MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 2, at 324. That question has formed
151.
the basis for Paula Jones's theory of the case against President Clinton. See Michael
lsikoff & Evan Thomas, The Secret War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1998, at 36. The spector
of other similar acts may have prompted the President's lawyers to move for summary
judgment assuming that Paula Jones's allegations are true. Monica Lewinsky's allegations
· may make a jury more inclined to believe that Clinton did proposition Jones. See Jeffrey
Tolan, The Trouble with Sex: Why the Law of Sexual Harassment Has Never Worked,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 1998, at 48, 52.
Ensuring that jurors do not misuse evidence motivates many rules of evidence
152.
including Rule 412; Rule 407, which prevents the use of subsequent remedial measures
to prove culpable conduct; and Rule 411, which prevents evidence that a person is insured
or uninsured to prove whether that person acted wrongfully, to name a few. The rules
also allow admission of evidence when necessary despite the presence of general rules
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alleged victim's past sexual behavior1s3 or sexual predisposition,154
subject to a balancing test provided in the rule, Iss in sexual misconduct
civil cases. 1s6 The inclusion of "harm to the victim" as part of the

precluding such adplission. For example, Rule 404(a)(l) allows an accused to offer
evidence of a pertinent trait of his or her character; Rule 404(a)(2) allows the accused
to offer a pertinent trait of the victim; and 404(a)(3) allows a witness's character for
truthfulness to be attacked. Rule 106 allows an adverse party to introduce any other part
of a writing or recording when the other party has introduced a part and fairness requires
the parts be considered contemporaneously. This assumption is also reflected in case law.
Justice O'Connor noted that to say that something makes no difference in law does not
mean that it makes no difference in fact in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
153.
"Sexual behavior" is broadly defined in the Advisory Committee Note to
provide protection to victims. It is not merely sexual intercourse but includes conduct
which implies sexual contact, dreams and fantasies. FED. R. EviD. 412(a)(1) advisory
committee's note.
"Sexual predisposition" provides even broader protection to victims,
154.
prohibiting dress, speech or lifestyle evidence that may obliquely imply a disposition on
the part of the alleged victim. FED. R. EviD. 412(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
155.
In civil cases, the ultimate decision concerning admissibility is left to the
judge through the application of a balancing test, weighing the dangers of "harm to any
victim" and risk of "unfair prejudice to any party" against probative value. FED. R.
EviD. 412(b)(2). When assessing prejudice, the court looks at the evidence offered and
assesses its impact on the jury and the fact-finding process, with the goal of arriving at
the truth.
156.
Rule 412 applies to evidence of sexual conduct or predisposition of alleged
victims of sexual misconduct. The Advisory Committee Note states, "The terminology
'alleged victim' is used because there will frequently be a factual dispute as to whether
sexual misconduct occurred. It does not connote any requirement that the misconduct be
alleged in the pleadings." FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
The rule does not prohibit the use of sexual history evidence to impugn the
credibility of a witness or party in a vast array of actions. In fact, it is a common defense
tactic to encourage plaintiffs to withdraw their claims in a wide variety of cases not
premised upon sexual misconduct. In those cases, Rule 412 would not stand as a bar.
See Schultz & Woo, supra note 65, at A1. The only limit on the use of such evidence
in cases like race discrimination or run-of-the-mill tort claims is a Rule 401 or 403
objection suggesting such evidence is irrelevant, or more prejudicial than probative. The
Advisory Committee Notes do not define how broad a meaning should be given to the
words "alleged victim of sexual misconduct." If a credibility question arises that may
affect whether Rule 412 applies, the amendment to Rule 412 specifically determines that
issues of conditional fact are to be left to the jury. United States v. Platero, 72 F .3d 806,
813 (lOth Cir. 1995). It is clear that Rule 412 extends to witnesses who were victims of
alleged sexual misconduct when they testify in cases involving alleged sexual misconduct.
Wright & Graham discuss this problem and offer several examples of fact patterns in
which the lack of definition might pose problems:
Is the spouse of a rape victim also a "victim of alleged sexual
misconduct" by virtue of the financial and psychological stress imposed by the
crime? Is the sexual partner of the victim a victim if the defendant infected
the victim with a sexually transmitted disease that spread to the partner? How
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balancing test is perhaps the key to the effective implementation of
amended Rule 412. It focuses the court on the impact of evidence on the
victim. This assessment is less concerned with increasing the ability of
the court to arrive at the truth than with the social policy determination
that a victim of sexual assault should not be subject to harassment. If the
proponent of the evidence can demonstrate that the proposed evidence is
otherwise admissible under the rules and its probative value substantially
outweighs the harm to any victim or of unfair prejudice to any party, the
evidence is admissible. By requiring the evidence to be "otherwise
admissible," the evidence must also meet the strictures of Rule 404,
which precludes the use of evidence as inference of character to prove
conduct in conformity with that character. The Advisory Committee157
made clear that its goal was to use the rules of evidence to "remedy
stereotypical thinking in the fact-finding process. " 158 As drafted, Rule
412 substantially limits what had become a typical defense used in sexual
harassment cases. The rule thwarts the attempt to imply, "she invited it."
Juries will no longer be treated to lurid stories about the plaintiffs alleged
sexual exploits. Without such tales, juries can evaluate a claim of sexual
misconduct unhampered by that bias. Thus the same concerns that
motivated the exclusion of character evidence under Rule 412 justify the
need to admit character evidence under Rule 415.
about the owner of a motel who is sued for failing to protect the patron-victim
against rape and who loses business as a result of unfavorable publicity? Is
the person falsely accused of sexual misconduct a "victim of sexual
misconduct"?
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5384.1 (footnotes omitted).
157.
During the development of the rules, there were recommendations from a
number of different advisory committees including the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, and the Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence. In this Article I refer to the various committees by role as "the
Advisory Committee" for the sake of simplicity.
158.
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1994 amendment states:
The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy,
potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public
disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into
the factfinding process. By affording victims protection in most instances, the
rule also encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to
participate in legal proceedings against alleged. offenders.
Rule 412 seeks to achieve these objectives by barring evidence relating
to the alleged victim's sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition,
whether offered as substantive evidence or for impeachment, except in
designated circumstances in which the probative value of the evidence
significantly outweighs possible harm to the victim.
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (pertaining to the 1994 amendments).
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If the primary purpose of the fact finding process is to arrive at the
truth, the law must assume that judges and juries act as they are, with all
their inherent biases, not as one would wish them to be. Rule 415's goal
is to counter the biases that make it difficult for the fact finder to follow
the law . 159 In enacting Rule 412, Congress specifically stated that it
will help in resisting pervasive stereotypes. 160 Once rules of evidence
can be used to combat societal stereotypes, it should not matter whether
the purpose is to preclude the introduction of arguably relevant evidence,
as in 412, or to mandate the inclusion of other evidence, as in 415.

3. SYMMETRY
It will undoubtedly be argued that Rules 412 and 415 stack the deck
in the plaintiffs favor. Rule 415 says that prior sexual misconduct is
relevant and probative of behavior on the present oecasion. 161 That
determination seems to directly contradict the rationale in Rule 412 that
a woman's sexual history is not a good predictor of her present
behavior. 162 The apparent inconsistency of these premises could be
claimed to render the rules asymmetrical. 163 This perceived lack of

159.
Though the jury's assumption that one complaint is not enough may also be
present in the criminal context, I believe the presumption of innocence should override
the admission of this kind of evidence. I am persuaded by the critics of Rules 413 and
414 that these rules raise significant constituti<;>nal problems, increase the probability of
conviction of innocent men, and operate in a racist and classist fashion. The defendant
in a civil case, on the other hand, is not entitled to a presumption of innocence, does not
risk incarceration, and the factors that result in racist application are not as present. See
supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
See 1 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 87, at 571.
160.
Under amended Rule 412, the plaintiff's allegations that a supervisor touched
161.
her behind or her breasts through clothing would be sufficient to qualify the plaintiff as
a "victim of sexual misconduct," thereby protected by the rule. FED. R. EVID. 412.
Furthermore, the acts constitute "sexual assault" as defined in Rule 413, thus qualifying
the action as "a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on
a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault." FED.
R. EVID. 415(a). Tbis would allow a plaintiff to introduce the defendant's prior acts of
sexual assault for any relevant purpose, but the defendant would be prevented from
introducing the plaintiffs prior conduct to prove present behavior.
162.
However, it might not be directly contradictory because Rule 412 includes
an overriding justification not present in Rule 415, the concern for potential harm or
embarrassment of the victim.
163.
One answer to this "lack of symmetry" might be that the behaviors are not
symmetrical. Rule 415 allows the admission of prior sexual assault to prove a number
of unfavorable determinations for the defendant, ranging from the fact that he did the act
in question to proof of knowledge of the employer. Such evidence is unequivocal. It can
never be used to support a defendant's claim. Indeed the defendant could not offer prior
"good" acts to rebut, since that would violate Rule 404(b). Rule 412 concerns itself with
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symmetry may have an impact on the judicial decisionmaker. 164 If a
prior sexual acts to prove consent or welcomeness in a case that is now a claim of rape
or harassment. Such prior acts are at best equivocal. They. could be offered by either
party: the defendant could offer them to show that the alleged victim is the kind of person
who is likely to enjoy sexual activity and therefore welcomed this attention; the plaintiff
might offer them to rebut the claim that she is making a false accusation by showing that
she has enjoyed sexual activity in the past without claiming rape or harassment. That is,
if the victim had twenty instances of consensual sex similar to the case at bar, in the
absence of other evidence of motivation, "the most reasouable inference is that she
claimed rape this time because she was raped." 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11,
§ 5387, at 584 n.51. Given that this evidence can be used to support and detract from the
plaintiff's claim, it arguably should be treated differently from prior acts of sexual assault
by the defendant. See Park, supra note 126, at 277-78 (noting difference between a
defendant's prior sexual misconduct and a victim's prior sexual history).
Karen Fingar addresses this lack of symmetry by pointing out that these are very
different behaviors. The evidence of a victim's past history is "normal" sex and thus has
very little probative value in a rape case. Sex offenders, however, demonstrate deviant
behavior, thus placing the accused in a small class of depraved sex offenders and making
the evidence highly probative of his guilt. Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The

Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 501,545 (1996).
This analysis fails to account for the "round up the usual suspects" phenomenon. See
supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
The sponsors of Rule 413, 414, and 415 characterized the argument that this rule
was inconsistent with Rule 412's rape shield as "not well-founded." 137 CONG. REc.
S3241 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). They noted that "[t]he rules of evidence do not
generally aim at a superficial neutrality between rules of admission affecting the victim
and defendant" when policies argue for treating them differently. /d. They argued that
the prior sexual behavior of the victim· has little probative value in predicting whether she
consented to the charged sexual acts. "In contrast, evidence showing that the defendant
has committed rapes on other occasions places him in a small class of depraved criminals,
and is likely to be highly probative in relation to the pending charge." /d. The sponsors
added that rape shield laws further the important purpose of encouraging victims to report
rapes. Such public purpose does not extend to the defendant. One may find the legislative
justification persuasive in the criminal arena, when a victim is merely a witness in the
case. In a civil case, the victim is the moving party and the defendant is there at her
instigation. Finally, the sponsors point to the goal of safeguarding the privacy of rape
victims. They note that her private sexual acts are quite different from the prior violent
sex crimes of the defendant which he has no legitimate interest in suppressing. /d.
Once again, these justifications are framed as if Rule 415, the civil application of
Rules 413 and 414, does not exist. In a civil case, some justifications lose their
persuasiveness. Although a plaintiff may be offering evidence of the defendant's prior act
of rape to assist in the proof of her case, more often the prior acts will be of a more
equivocal nature. Furthermore, these justifications assume a guilty defendant and an
ilmocent victim. That may be, of course, the issue before the court, and such an approach
may be generally appealing when the defendant is accused of child molestation or a
violent stranger rape. However, when the plaintiff is an employee and one of the
defendants is her corporate employer, assumptions of guilt are less intuitive.
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plaintiff seeks to introduce the defendant's history of sexual assault, a
court might be less willing to exclude the plaintiff's sexual history out of
a sense of perceived fairness. 165 A plaintiff might therefore choose not
to seek this kind of information for fear that it will increase the likelihood
of a wholesale attack on her background. The potential that Rule 415
might undermine Rule 412 could be the most persuasive justification for
abandoning this foray into character evidence. There needs to be a
compelling reason for this apparent asymmetry. 166
Indeed, there is. Both Rule 412 and Rule 415 are geared toward
reducing fact finder bias. Rule 412 does not rest on the assumption that
sexual character evidence is irrelevant in predicting present behavior. It
is premised on the idea that courts should not tolerate wholesale attacks
on the sexual character of a person to encourage the fact finder not to
believe that person. It is designed to undercut bias that jurors bring to the
fact fmding process. Rule 415 is an important companion to Rule 412.
It is also concerned with fact finder bias. Instead of precluding evidence
that invites such bias, Rule 415 ensures that the rules of evidence do not
preclude evidence that would counteract that bias. 167 Rules 412 and 415
can be used to cleanse the fact finding process of biases that have

164.
The legislative history of Rules 413, 414, and 415 noted that the presence of
rape shield laws have "given rise to an argument that it would be unfair or inappropriate
to be more permissive in admitting evidence of the commission of other sex crimes by the
defendant." 137 CONG. REc. S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
165.
The lack of symmetry is highlighted by the fact that rulings on proposed 412
and 415 evidence will occur at the same t~e. either through motions for protection order
at the discovery stage or, as mandated by both rules, after mandatory pre-trial disclosure
and at pre-trial hearings under the rules of civil procedure.
166.
Rule 415 allows a plaintiff to offer evidence of prior acts of sexual assault to
show action in conformity but does not allow the defendant to rebut that evidence with
evidence tending to show that the defendant is not the kind of person who engages in
sexual assault. This particular symmetry problem seems troubling on its face. In fact,
the Judicial Conference identified it as one of the problems with the rule and suggested
that specific provisions be adopted to expressly allow the party against whom such
evidence is offered to use similar evidence in rebuttal. Report of Judicial Conference,
supra note 57, at 54. Practically, however, a defendant is unlikely to seek to offer such
evidence. Rebuttal evidence lacks specificity and will open those witnesses to cross
examination about their knowledge of the previously admitted evidence of sexual assault.
A strategic defendant will be unlikely to want that evidence reiterated.
Some might argue that this problem could be remedied through the use of an
167.
instruction to the jury. Such an instruction might say that the jury should draw no
conclusions from plaintiff's failure to produce prior similar acts by the defendant. Such
a solution is unsatisfactory, however. First, it is unlikely that a defendant would agree
to such an instruction treating it as tantamount to "Don't think about elephants." Second,
an instruction would be litigant initiated. The Federal Rules provide a legislated response
to a societal problem that is consistent with the goal of remedying bias in the courtroom.
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reinforced the asymmetry of power and powerlessness in matters of
sex. 168 Both of these rules assist the trier of fact in focusing on the
behavior of the alleged perpetrator, rather than indulging in stereotypic
beliefs that women cannot be believed when making claims of sexual
misconduct. The result is a potentially powerful tool to combat long-held
stereotypes that have infected sexual misconduct cases: that the victim
either invited the treatment, or deserved it, or is not to be believed
without sufficient corroboration.
While most of the criticism of these new and revised rules has
focused on the potential harm of admitting prior acts evidence, the real
problem with Rule 415 is that it imposes inadequate limits on the
admission of such evidence. The plain meaning of the rule suggests that
a plaintiff can introduce any sexual character evidence minimally relevant
to the issues before the court, as long as that behavior meets the broad
definition of sexual assault. In essence, a plaintiff is invited to paint the
defendant as a "bad man" in hope of enticing a jury to find the facts of
the present case in her favor. So construed, Rule 415 goes too far.

B. Proposed Coverage of Rule 415
1.

PRIOR CONDUCT

No change in Rule 415 is necessary to allow the admission of prior
acts of offensive sexual touching. Nevertheless, unless the rule is
construed more narrowly, Rule 415 evidence suffers from the same

168.
Susan Estrich identified how evidence rules functioned as a "one-way rachet"
against women in Sex at Work. Estrich, supra note 43, at 849. Courts were more than
willing to admit evidence of a woman's dress, fantasies and sexual history to assess her
credibility but at the same time to preclude evidence of her alleged harasser's prior acts
of sexual harassment. She argues that the idea that we should be egalitarian about sexual
history evidence enhances the asymmetry of power and powerlessness inside the
workplace. /d. Her suggestion for approximating symmetry is consistent with my
proposed revision of Rule 415:
So if there is to be symmetry-and I have yet to read an opinion
embracing a one-way ratchet favoring women-it must be of a more limited
kind. Lines must be drawn to limit the admissibility of evidence in order to
protect women, even if those legal parameters also protect men. We must
draw evidentiary lines at the workplace which render purely personal life
irrelevant. We must draw lines between sex and aggression which make
evidence of the latter admissible, even if the line between the two is an
artificial one. I want to know if the man has been prosecuted or sued for rape
elsewhere, or arrested for domestic assault, and I want to know even if the
cost of knowing is also asking whether the woman has ever complained of
rape.
ld. at 850.
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problems that prompted the need for Rule 412: it is overinclusive.
Instead of making sexual character evidence admissible for any relevant
purpose, admissibility should be limited to evidence offered to corroborate
the plaintiffs story. Concomitant with that narrowing, the evidence must
also be corroborating-that is, the sexual character evidence must be
substantially similar to the act alleged.
Courts could look to several factors to determi~e the probative value
of the evidence. These factors include:
•

similarity in type between the alleged events and prior
events;

•

similarity in relationship between alleged perpetrator
and alleged victim in each circumstance;

•

similarity in settings in which the events took place;

•

proximity in time; and

•

frequency of other acts. 169

Such a construction of Rule 415 would reap the benefits of
propensity evidence without undermining Rule 412. 170 Although still
169.
These factors are similar to those proposed by the Judicial Conference when
it offered alternative language for Congress to adopt in lieu of Rule 413, 414, and 415.
The proposed alternative Rule 404 included the following language:
(A) In weighing the probative value of such evidence, the court may, as part
of its Rule 403 determination, consider:
(i) proximity in time to the charged or predicate
misconduct;
(ii) similarity to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(iii) frequency of the other acts;
(iv) surrounding circumstances;
(v) relevant intervening events; and
(vi) other relevant similarities or differences.
Report of Judicial Conference, supra note 57, at 55. One could argue that courts could
import this narrowing through the application of Rule 403 and therefore no change would
be necessary. This argument may be undercut by Congress's rejection of the Judicial
Conference's suggestion of how Rule 403 should be used. Even if these factors could be
used now with Rule 415 as drafted, this does not take care of the rule's underinclusive
coverage. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
170.
That such a reading would provide a bit more symmetry is borne out by
evidentiary rulings under Rule 412. Defendants can "corroborate" their stories by
offering evidence of "welcomeness" or, if such evidence is available, showing that the
plaintiff made a similar claim of sexual harassment in the past that was proven to be
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relying on general propensity, using this kind of evidence to corroborate
a victim's story is considerably narrower than admitting sexual character
evidence merely to imply that this is a bad person who should be found
liable because he is so bad. 171 For example, thirty-year-old allegations
of statutory rape or more recent allegations of child molestation would not
be usable in a present case of sexual harassment if these factors are used.
The suggested refinement of Rule 415 would limit evidence of
corroboration to substantially similar behavior by the alleged
perpetrator. 172 This requirement of similarity not only provides useful
evidence of corroboration but it also has considerably more probative
value than any general evidence that the defendant is a "bad guy." Social
science evidence suggests that the predictive value of behavior depends on
its similarity to the alleged activity .173 This modification of Rule 415
unfounded. It is also worth noting that facial symmetry may not be symmetry in fact.
Susan Estrich writes about symmetry in evidence rules:
A rule treating evidence of a woman's other sexual relationships the same as
such evidence about the man may seem egalitarian; the impact of such
evidence may not be. Men with active sex lives are normal, desirable,
successful. Women are loose, easy, unworthy. Men are "Don Juans."
Women are whores.
Estrich, supra note 43, at 849.
171.
See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 5.05. This narrowing would be applied
when Rule 415 evidence is offered on a general propensity theory of relevance.
Otherwise prior acts of sexual assault could continue to be used when a "non-propensity"
theory of relevance is articulated. Courts have allowed prior acts evidence to prove
substantive issues when offered for a non-propensity purpose. Any time prior acts are
admitted under 404(b), they have the additional effect of bolstering the plaintiff's
credibility, but Rule 404 would not allow a plaintiff to argue that effect to the jury. For
example, a plaintiff's attorney could argue that the prior acts of similar conduct
demonstrate a motive or intent on the part of the defendant to engage in sexual
harassment. The attorney could not argue that those prior acts support the plaintiff's story
of what happened and lend credibility to her claims. Rule 415 would allow arguments to
the jury that appeal to the 404(b) "non-propensity purpose" and the Rule 415 general
propensity purpose.
172.
Imwinkelried suggests that when courts evaluate the probative value of prior
misconduct evidence, they should determine how clearly the prior act has been proven,
how probative the evidence is of the material fact, and how seriously disputed the
material fact is. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, at ch. 8.
173.
Davies, supra note 131. Davies points out that commentators suspicions of
jurors' inability to use the evidence fairly and reliably are not well-founded. She states:
Where the prior behavior or a character trait is described with sufficient
particularity and where it occurred in an analogous context, it may be highly
probative of the conduct in question. . . . Although misuse of character
evidence admitted for limited purposes is probably inevitable, the notion that
jurors overvalue the probativeness of character or make errors because of their
inability to make accurate assessments of character gains little reinforcement
from contemporary work in the social sciences.
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draws on that insight. For example, given the similarity in circumstances
and situation, a plaintiff should be able to show a defendant's charact~r
as a sexual harasser through the testimony of other employees in other
workplaces who also experienced offensive touching. She might also
draw parallels between the defendant as a customer in a bar fondling his
server and the defendant's and plaintiffs relationships within the office.
The testimony would be probative of his tendency to assume sexual access
to subordinate females, thus corroborating the plaintiffs assertion that he
sexually harassed her on the claimed occasion.
The application of the factors allows room for argument. For
example, domestic violence could at first appear to lack similarity to
/d. at 533.

Psychologists disagree about whether the inferences sought by the use of general
propensity evidence are sound. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove
Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. l, 2531 (1987); Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence:
Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 1003, 1041-60 (1984). Proponents of admission of this evidence typically rely on
trait theory to justify the prior acts' probative value. Trait theory is the belief that people
are made up of a collection of traits and those traits determine their behavior on any given
occasion. It has been generally discredited. Davies, supra note 131, at 513. Arguably
Rules 413 and 414 are not needed to admit this similar evidence because it may be
admissible under 404(b). Rule 404(b) allows the admission of prior act evidence if it is
so similar to the charged conduct that it is distinctive. Under those conditions, it may be
relevant to identity or intent if those issues are in contention. Thus one need not ascribe
to trait theory in order to find probative value. Even if such evidence reliably predicts
future behavior, many critics have argued that the research does not appear to justify
singling out prior sexual offenses for admission but not other kinds of offenses.
Bryden & Park discuss studies showing that the recidivism rate for sex offenders is
no higher and may be lower, than for other crimes. See Bryden & Park, supra note 15,
at 572. For example, a 1989 Bureau of Justice study of 100,000 offenders over a three
year period indicated that the recidivism rate was lower for sex offenders than most other
criminals (31.9% for burglars, 24.8% for drug offenders, 19.6% for robbers, 7.7% for
rapists, 2.8% for murderers). The authors note that these figures may be underrepresented because of the low reporting rate for sex offenses. Nevertheless, this may
also be true of other types of criminals, such as "purse snatchers, illegal gamblers,
shoplifters, recipients of stolen goods, drunken drivers, and drug offenders." /d. at 573.
That is, it is not clear that a person who has engaged in sexual misconduct in the past is
more likely to engage in it on a subsequent occasion than a non-sex offender is likely to
repeat the same non-sex offense. The authors discuss the debate among psychologists
concerning trait theory (suggesting that human beings possess certain traits that make their
behavior consistent in similar situations), situationism (suggesting that human behavior is
situationally specific and that character traits do not produce cross-situational stability of
behavior), and interactionism (emphasizing the need to examine a person's relevant traits
and the specifics of the situation in predicting behavior). /d. at 561-62. The unique
quality of sexual misconduct cases, however, may justify singling out sex offenses for
special treatment.
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charges of sexual harassment. However, an argument could be made,
depending on the factual circumstances, that the defendant's power
relationship to his subordinate shares many of the characteristics of the
power relationship between a husband and wife, and therefore, the
domestic violence may corroborate an alleged sexual harassment victim's
claims. These factors help guide the courts. in identifying whether the
evidence can be used to corroborate the plaintiffs claim. In addition,
courts can exercise their supervisory power to exclude evidence under
Rule 403. The mere fact that the evidence is offered for general
propensity purposes should not be deemed unfair prejudice. However,
other Rule 403 considerations may still atise. 174
2.

SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS

If Rule 415 evidence is limited to the defendant's prior acts that
corroborate, it is underinclusive in its definition of sexual misconduct.
At present, Rule 415's definition of covered acts, though broader than
perhaps its drafters anticipated, does not include the vast array of nonphysical sexual misconduct that constitutes sexual harassment. For
example, as presently drafted, Rule 415 would not allow evidence that the
defendant had propositioned or made sexual comments to other women
because that does not involve sexual touching. 175 The better solution is
to narrow Rule 415 so sexual character evidence could only be used for
corroborative or credibility purposes, while expanding the list of
behaviors admissible under Rule 415 to include nonphysical sexual
misconduct such as comments and propositions. Rule 412 applies in cases
involving alleged sexual misconduct. 176 Deciding whether an act
constitutes sexual misconduct under Rule 412 has not proven to be too
obscure for the courts. 177 Expanding the definition of corroborating
evidence would make Rule 415 more consistent with the purpose of
countering the "one charge of sexual misconduct is not enough" biases
found in a jury.
174.
See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
175.
For example, sexual harassment cases are not brought by women who have
sex with their supervisor and then get promoted. The women who say "no" bring the
cases. Such prior "consensual" sexual relationships between a supervisor and women in
the office would not constitute "sexual assault" for purposes of Rule 415. Such evidence
would be necessary for the plaintiff to show that she was disadvantaged due to her
unwillingness to have sex with the supervisor.
176.
The protection of Rule 412 only arises in proceedings involving alleged sexual
misconduct. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5384.1.
177.
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Many substantive claims in sexual harassment cases hinge on
credibility. 178 To prove sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff
must either prove that a sexually harassing work environment exists or
that submission to sexual conduct was made a condition of receiving a
tangible employment benefit. To prove hostile environment, the plaintiff
must prove that sexual harassment within the workplace is sufficiently
severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of employment and creates
an abusive working environment. The plaintiffs credibility necessarily
affects a juror's assessment of these issues. 179 Rule 415 evidence might
be useful to bolster the plaintiff's credibility when she attempts to show
that the offense was:
•

objectionable to a reasonable person. 180
A
plaintiff's assertion that she was offended may be
undermined by the jury's bias. She may be assumed
to be unbelievable or hypersensitive. Evidence of the
defendant's prior sexual misconduct lends credibility
to her claims.

•

gender-based. 181

A defendant might argue his acts

178.
Rule 415 as narrowed would not supersede evidence offered under Rule
404(b). Already many courts have found rationales to allow evidence of prior conduct
of the alleged perpetrator to show elements of a sexual harassment claim. For example,
in addition to the issues of proof outlined infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text, the
plaintiff might offer the defendant's sexual character evidence to address whether the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct. Such prior acts evidence
may also be used to show that the corporate entity should have known of the supervisor's
harassment in order to establish liability for "hostile environment" purposes. If a plaintiff
can produce several employees willing to testify about prior acts, it reduces the likelihood
the defendant's claims of ignorance are believable. See, e.g., Kopp v. Samaritan Health
Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993). If an employer knows of the defendant's
proclivities, the plaintiff might claim the employer had constructive notice of harassment.
In Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777 (lOth Cir. 1995), the
court found constructive knowledge as arising from knowledge of the harasser's conduct
toward other employees "that is similar in nature and near in time" to the harassment of
the plaintiff. Id. at 784. Because this evidence would be offered on a non-propensity
theory, i.e., notice, Rule 415 would be unnecessary to ensure its admissibility.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
179.
180.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the conduct was offensive. /d.;
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1499-1501 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
EEOCv. GumesslnnCorp., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 871,878 (N.D. Dl. 1988),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1990).
181.
Courts have allowed the use of prior acts evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove
motive. See Wendorfv. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,316
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va.
1985); Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981); Halpert v. Wertheim
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were not motivated by the plaintiffs sex but were
merely horseplay directed toward everyone, male or
female, in the workplace. This essentially is an
argument that she is overreacting to workplace pranks
and "reading in" a gender motivation.
The
defendant's prior acts of sexual misconduct might be
offered to show a gender-specific sexual motivation
under Rule 404(b). Such acts may also undercut the
implication that the plaintiff was hypersensitive.

unwelcome. 182

•

The claim that the plaintiff
welcomed the conduct is usually bolstered by evidence
of the plaintiffs prior sexual conduct (now limited by
revised Rule 412). If that proof implies the plaintiff
sought the attention and is now "crying foul," or that
the defendant misunderstood her purported
"invitation," the defendant could be inviting the jury
to indulge in impermissible stereotypes. Sexual
character evidence offered against the defendant might
undermine the jury's tendency to embrace the
suggestion that the plaintiff is prevaricating.

•

pervasive. 183

An aspect of the pervasiveness
measure dovetails with the assessment of
offensiveness. In each, the fact finder is asked to
evaluate a plaintiffs assertion that workplace behavior
affected her ability to work. Using Rule 415, a
plaintiff could show other acts of sexual assault by the
defendant within the workplace that occurred prior to
her employment, and thereby bolster her assertion that

& Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bennett v. Corroon &
Black Corp., 517 So. 2d 1245 (La. Ct. App. 1987). That evidence would continue to be
admissible under that theory.
See, e.g., Hom v. Duke Homes, 155 F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 1985) (three
182.
women came forward to testify the same supervisor had harassed them); Priest v. Rotary,
634 F. Supp. 571, 574-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (other women testified to show that the
restaurant owner had engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment).
183.
To prevail in a claim of a sexually harassing work environment, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the harassment is pervasive. Pervasiveness is extremely difficult
to prove. The plaintiff must show that the harassment is sufficient "to alter the conditions
of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment." Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982). Even though courts have allowed such
evidence prior to the adoption of Rule 415 to show pattern or practice, the new rule
expands admissibility.
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such activity was pervasive enough to affect the
conditions of her employment.

In addition, sexual character evidence can be used to combat
traditional defenses to sexual harassment complaints. 184 Often it is the
third or fourth woman to be harassed who brings the suit. She may
succeed because she has the corroboration of the others. Prior acts within
the workplace before the plaintiff was employed undermine the
defendant's implied assertion that he does not engage in sexually
harassing activity. The behavior outside of the workplace may also be
relevant. A person who engaged in sexual misconduct outside of the
workplace undermines his claims that he is an "angel" in the office. 185
For example, ·a frequently seen attack is to suggest that a plaintiffs delay
in complaining or failure to complain suggests she concocted the whole
story. 186 The absence of a prompt complaint reinforces the fact finder's
bias to disbelieve the complainant. Sexual character evidence regarding
the defendant corroborates the plaintiffs story and helps counteract
credibility damage caused by the absence of prompt complaint.
As with all rules that attempt to cope with how things are rather than
how one wishes them to be, using the rules to show corroboration might

184.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 415, some courts would admit evidence of
similar complaints of employees that occurred during the same time period as the events
alleged by the plaintiff to establish a pattern of sexual harassment. The majority rule for
the circuits is to review the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if the workplace
is abusive. This has allowed some courts to look at similar acts of sexual harassment
during the plaintiff's employment. See, e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th
Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (lOth Cir. 1987); Shrout v. Black
Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp.
1269 (D.D.C. 1988). For a comprehensive discussion of the analysis of hostile work
environment cases, see Sarah E. Burns, Evidence of a Sexually Hostile Workplace: What
Is It and How Should It Be Assessed After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 21 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1994). Others would not allow such a showing. See, e.g.,
Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984); Goffv. Continental Oil Co., 678
F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982); Moorhousev. Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Pa.), ajJ'd
without opinion, 639 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir. 1980); Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988).
See Estrich, supra note 43, at 849.
185.
186.
Pervasiveness claims are often undermined by evidence that the woman did
not promptly or clearly complain of the treatment. Defendants posit that the harassment
could not have been so severe as to alter the conditions of her employment. See, e.g.,
Sand v. George P. Johnson Co., 33 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 716, 727 (1982);
Walter, 518 F. Supp. at 1314-15. Commentators have suggested that to believe this logic,
the fact finder must ignore power imbalances in the workplace, the lack of availability of
a meaningful or effective complaint process, and the woman's fear that a complaint may
result in harsher treatment or the loss of a much-needed job. See Estrich, supra note 43,
at 845-47.
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risk reinforcing the biases the rules purport to cure. 187 Advocating the
admission of such evidence is not without its problems. For example,
courts might come to expect such evidence. At this point, there is no
data on bow many alleged sexual harassers have histories of engaging in
similar behavior. Defendants might attempt to argue the lack of
corroborating evidence to the fact finder. After such an argument, juries
might consider its absence significant. Courts could begin to look for
prior evidence of sexual assault as a part of the proof of the case, thus
raising the threshold that plaintiffs have to meet to survive a summary
judgment motion. 188 The need for corroboration might be intensified by
187.
This is not a new problem and it comes up in other contexts. For example,
the same argument is made in the affirmative action debate over color blindness. The
failure to be color blind may reinforce some of the same bias that prompted a need for
a remedy, yet being color blind may reinforce the status quo that prompted the need for
a remedy. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I Seen: White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993). Richard
Wasserstrom identifies three perspectives that complicate meaningful debate about how
the law should address problems of bias. The first of these perspectives concentrates on
what in fact is true in culture; the second is concerned with the way things ought to be;
and the third looks to the means by which the ideal may be achieved. Richard A.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics,
24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977).
188.
Another effect of these rules may be to create an incentive for defendants to
go on the offensive. If a defendant alleged that the plaintiff was the sexual aggressor, that
in this instance she had initiated the sexual touching it may affect the admissibility of
defendant's alleged prior sexual assaults. Arguably he would be able to claim protection
under Rule 412 and perhaps be able to discover and admit evidence of the plaintiff's prior
acts that may constitute sexual assault under Rules 413 and 415.
To claim protection under Rule 412, one need only be an alleged victim of sexual
misconduct. The defendant could not gain victim status by alleging that he has been
falsely accused of sexual misconduct. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
The note says that if a person sues a newspaper for defamation for falsely claiming that
the plaintiff consented to a violent sexual encounter, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be
characterized as a victim. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5384.1. The
rule requires more than merely suggesting that the plaintiff initiated the relationship and
therefore "welcomed" it. The "sexual aggressor" defense has been raised to try to
prevent limitations on discovery in Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 501 (D.N.M.
1996). The court interpreted the defense as an assertion of welcomeness, and limited
discovery by time and workplace without deciding admissibility at trial. /d. The
defendant asserting such defense would have to allege that the sexual contact was
unwanted. If he could make a good faith showing of unwanted sexual contact, he might
fit the definition of "alleged victim of sexual misconduct" anticipated by Rule 412. The
Advisory Committee Notes say that the word "alleged" is used "because there will
frequently be a factual dispute as to whether sexual misconduct occurred." FED. R. EVID.
412 advisory committee's note. This defense need not appear in the pleadings. /d. The
determination of whether the defendant fits the characterization as an "alleged victim of
sexual misconduct" is a matter of conditional relevance to be decided by the jury. See
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5384.1. If he should be determined to be such
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a rule that specifically allows such evidence to be admitted on that theory
of relevance.
There may come a time when such evidence is not needed, but that
time has not yet arrived. Sexual assault and harassment are such
pervasive and debilitating aspects of women's lives that one cannot afford
to ignore the substantial obstacle to achieving justice caused by a jury's
need for corroboration. As long as one can anticipate that a juror will not
believe the plaintiff unless she is backed by others with similar stories,
then if such evidence is available, it should be freely admissible.
VI. CONCLUSION

In its zeal to convict child molesters and rapists, Congress has
created a civil rule that might have far more impact than the criminal
rules upon which it is premised. If courts follow the law as passed by
Congress, Rules 412 and 415 will shift the balance of power in civil
actions arising from sexual misconduct. A victim of sexual misconduct
may invoke the shield of the amended Rule 412, thus precluding in
greater measure than previously possible the introduction of the victim's
prior sexual conduct or evidence of sexual predisposition to imply that she
apparently invited, consented to, or welcomed the alleged sexual
misconduct. But the alleged perpetrator of sexual misconduct may also
find himself confronted with his own sexual history if the offered
evidence constitutes sexual assault under the rules, which includes sexual
touching permitted through fear.
Under the rules as presently
constructed, such evidence can be offered for whatever purpose is
a victim, all the proposed evidence of the defendant's prior sexual assault conduct would
be subject to Rule 412's more rigorous balancing test. The balancing would only occur
if the court should find that Rule 415 is not a rule of mandatory admissibility. See supra
notes 72-89 and accompanying text. Given the court's dim view of the probative value
of this evidence when doing the less rigorous 403 balancing, it would appear that the
defendant's prior conduct would be inadmissible.
.
If the defendant discovered and sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff has
"sexually assaulted" others as defined in Rule 413 he would encounter significant
problems. Characterizing workplace sexual activity as prior sexual assault is likely to be
considerably more difficult for a supervisor than an employee. The definition of sexual
assault that a plaintiff might rely upon for purposes of the rule requires that the contact
be done under conditions of fear. In the employment case, that fear is generated by the
power of the supervisor in the supervisor/supervisee relationship. Even if the defendant
were able to show evidence that meets the definitional requirements of Rule 413, he would
not be able to seek admission under Rule 415. By its terms, Rule 415 only allows the
evidence of the defendant's prior acts of sexual assault to be used. Since the plaintiff is
not the defendant, such evidence must meet the strictures of Rule 404(b). Thus, the
defendant would not be able to offer alleged prior acts unless he counterclaimed for the
sexual misconduct.
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relevant, including general propensity: the alleged victim may offer
evidence against the alleged perpetrator of prior sexual acts to show that
he engages in such acts, and therefore probably engaged in those acts this
time.
An analysis of recent case law suggests, however, that these changes
have begun to eause a backlash. Courts are resisting character evidence
and exercising their supervisory powers under Rule 403 to preclude
sexual character evidence under Rule 415. Yet victims of sexual
misconduct suffer now under a legal system that treats their story as
unbelievable unless corroborated. Although Rule 415 is flawed, itlevels
the playing field for victims of sexual misconduct by allowing plaintiffs
to introduce evidence to bolster ·their credibility.· The rule should be
narrowed so that relevance is limited to similar-acts evidence offered as
corroboration to combat jury bias. At the same time, it should be
expanded to include a wider array of sexual misconduct cases. In this
way, Congress could achieve. its goal of protecting the victims of sexual
offenses while preserving basic fairness in the administration of trials.

